Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws by Kuehn, Robert R.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 9 
Issue 2 Volume 9, Spring 1994, Issue 2 Article 25 
March 1994 
Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
Robert R. Kuehn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Kuehn, Robert R. (1994) "Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws," Journal of Civil 
Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 9 : Iss. 2 , Article 25. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol9/iss2/25 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an 
authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
REMEDYING THE UNEQUAL
ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS
ROBERT R. KUEHN*
INTRODUCTION
Noncompliance with environmental laws is widespread. In a
1993 survey, more than two-thirds of corporate counsel admitted
that at some point in the past year their businesses operated in
violation of state or federal environmental laws.' Widespread vio-
lations of air pollution, water pollution, waste disposal, ground-
water monitoring and drinking water requirements have been
found.2
Government efforts to enforce environmental laws have in-
creased in recent years. Federal enforcement actions under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") increased from
1,755 in 1991, to 1,935 in 1992, and 2,110 in 1993. 3 Penalties as-
sessed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") for environmental violations reached an all-time high in
Fiscal Year 1992. 4 Over $78 million in judicial and administrative
penalties were assessed by EPA in 1992, an increase of about $5
million from 1991. 5 EPA judicial enforcement actions have in-
* Professor of Clinical Law, Tulane Law School, and Director, Tulane Environmental
Law Clinic. Professor Kuehn is a former trial attorney with the Environmental Enforce-
ment Section of the U.S. Department of Justice.
1 Environmental Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at S1. The reasons
given for the noncompliance include: employees can disobey instructions; inspectors must
find noncompliance to justify their job or visit; full compliance with all environmental laws
is not possible. Id. at S2.
2 See JOSEPH F. DIMENTo, ENvIRONmENTAL LAw AND AMERICAN BusNEss-DILEmMAs OF
COMPLIANCE 20, 23 (1986); Winston Harrington, Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are
Restricted, 37 J. PUBLIC ECON. 29, 31 (1988); Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforce-
ment, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION 243, 253-62 (Paul R. Portney
ed., 1990).
3 RCRA Penalties, Criminal Cases on Rise as EPA Announces 1993 Enforcement Totals,
8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 867 (1993).
4 More Money Received in Penalties Than Ever, But Number of Cases Declines, EPA Re-
port Says, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 354 (1993) [hereinafter More Money
Received in Penalties Than Ever].
5 Id.
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creased steadily from a little over 100 in Fiscal Year 1982 to 360
in Fiscal Year 1992; administrative actions have grown from
around 860 in Fiscal Year 1982 to over 3,600 in Fiscal Year 1992.6
State judicial enforcement actions increased from 400 in Fiscal
Year 1985 to 574 in 1992; state administrative actions have fluctu-
ated between 8,600 and 12,700 from 1985 to 1992, with water, air
and hazardous waste cases showing an increase, and pesticide
cases a decrease.7
The effects of noncompliance can be serious. Unauthorized re-
leases of toxic chemicals may pose acute health hazards to those
living in the vicinity of the facility. Moreover, if permits and pol-
lution standards are carefully set at levels that provide an ade-
quate margin of safety, and if noncompliance results in greater
amounts of pollution being emitted than calculated by the agency
in making its determination, then the surrounding community
may not, in fact, be provided the protection required by the law or
assumed by the agency.' In addition, the failure to enforce means
that an accurate history of noncompliance, and an accurate por-
trayal of the status of the facility and its operator, will not be
available to the agency or the public in subsequent permit or en-
forcement proceedings.9
Citizens have a right not only to expect that environmental laws
will be vigorously enforced, but also a right to expect that when
the government does enforce the laws, it will do so in a fair and
equitable manner. EPA has repeatedly identified equitable treat-
6 Id.; U.S. E.P.A., ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT-FISCAL YEA" 1991, at 3-1 to
3-3, App. Historical Enforcement Data (1992) [hereinafter U.S. E.P.A.].
7 See More Money Received in Penalties Than Ever, supra note 4; U.S. E.P.A., supra note
6, at 3-5 to 3-6, App. Historical Enforcement Data.
8 It has been argued that companies accept permit limitations with the understanding
that if there are compliance problems, the agencies will deal with those issues informally.
See Theodore L. Garrett, Citizens Suits: A Defense Perspective, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,162 (1986). It has also been noted that technology-based requirements under the
Clean Water Act are premised on the assumption that plants will not be able to achieve
100% compliance and, therefore, a certain amount of noncompliance is not intended to be
subject to enforcement action. Id. at 10,163. In setting risk-based standards, EPA does not
take into account a certain amount of willful noncompliance. Telephone interview with Dr.
Ellen Silvergeld, Environmental Defense Fund (Apr. 12, 1994).
9 The prior compliance history of a violator is relevant in: 1) calculating the size of subse-
quent penalties, see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1992); 2)
deciding if a permit should be issued or renewed see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2014(A)
(West 1989), and In re CECOS Intl, Inc., 574 So. 2d 385, 391-92 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied,
576 So. 2d 18 (La. 1991); and 3) determining eligibility to bid on or receive public contracts,
see 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (1988), 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 287.133 (West 1991).
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ment of the regulated community as a primary goal of its enforce-
ment efforts.10 What should be an equally important goal of EPA
and state environmental protection agencies is ensuring that their
enforcement efforts do not discriminate against any community or
class of persons. Government efforts to detect noncompliance with
environmental laws and the government's response to such non-
compliance should not differ because a community may be com-
prised of racial minorities or low income persons.
While nondiscrimination against minorities and low income
persons in enforcement of laws is expected by citizens and man-
dated by the law, the published enforcement policies of EPA do not
identify this as a goal of the agency. This silence stands in stark
contrast to the agency's repeated concern for evenhanded treat-
ment of regulated industries. Perhaps because environmental
agency enforcement policies have not acknowledged the need to
ensure that the agency's actions do not discriminate, evidence has
recently been presented indicating that the government's enforce-
ment of environmental laws has discriminated against racial mi-
norities and low income persons.
This article seeks to explore the government's unequal enforce-
ment of environmental laws in communities comprised of racial
minorities or low income persons. It first examines the evidence
that government agencies have enforced environmental laws with
less frequency or intensity in these communities. It then identi-
fies ways that citizens can force government agencies to more ag-
gressively and fairly enforce environmental laws in minority or
low income communities. The final section proposes some prelimi-
nary steps that can be taken by environmental agencies under ex-
isting statutes to help address unequal enforcement.
I. EVIDENCE OF UNEQUAL ENFORCEMENT
Many studies have shown that racial minorities and low income
communities are exposed to a disproportionate amount of
10 See, e.g., Cheryl E. Wasserman, An Overview of Compliance and Enforcement in the
United States: Philosophy, Strategies and Management Tools, in U.S. E.P.A., INTERNA-
TIONAL ENFORCEMENT WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 7, 9, 19 (1990); U.S. E.P.A., Policy on Civil
Penalties (1984) reprinted in [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:0761, 21:0762 (1993).
"The second goal of penalty assessment is the fair and equitable treatment of the regulated
community." Id.
19941
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America's pollution and waste." These studies have tended to fo-
cus on the disproportionate health hazards to which minorities
and the poor are exposed and on the discriminatory impact of the
siting of waste and toxic pollution facilities. However, largely un-
studied is whether government agencies have unequally enforced
existing environmental laws.
A. Unequal Penalties
In September 1992, the National Law Journal released the re-
sults of an eight-month study of EPA's enforcement of environ-
mental laws.12 The study examined all civil judicial enforcement
cases concluded by EPA between 1985 and March 1991, except
those cases for which information on the facility or surrounding
community was not available. 3 The National Law Journal then
compared the penalties in "white" communities to those in "minor-
ity" communities.' 4
The study found that, in general, penalties against violators of
environmental laws in minority communities were lower than
those imposed for violations in largely white areas. Penalties
under RCRA, the federal law that regulates the present treat-
ment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste, at sites having the
I1 See, e.g., Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evi-
dence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENViRoNMENTAL HAZARDs 163, 167 (Bunyan Bryant
& Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (of 15 studies to date on distribution of environmental hazards,
"in nearly every case the distribution of pollution has been found to be inequitable by in-
come. And with only one exception, the distribution of pollution has been found to be ineq-
uitable by race. Where the distribution of pollution has been analyzed by both income and
race (and where it was possible to weigh the relative importance of each), in most cases
race has been found to be more strongly related to the incidence of pollution."); Luke W.
Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental
Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOoY L.Q. 619, 622-27 & nn.8-18 (listing studies); Richard J. Lazarus,
Pursuing "Environmental Justice: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection,
87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 801-06 & nn.49-77 (1993) (listing studies).
Acting EPA Deputy Administrator Jonathan Z. Cannon stated: "At EPA, there is no
longer any doubt that people of color are hardest hit by pollution." Industry Doubts Equity
Problems Exist: Local Groups Look to Congress for Aid,[Leading the News] Daily Env't
News (BNA), at AA-1, AA-2, May 6, 1993.
12 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection-The Racial Divide in Envi-
ronmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1 to S12.
13 Id. at S4. Of the 1,091 cases, 929 concluded with some penalty. Id.
14 Id. Communities were classified using the most recent available census data, and the
facility's ZIP code was used to define the adjacent community. Id. To compare white and
minority communities, the communities around the facilities were divided into "four equal
groups, or 'quartiles', ranging from those with the highest to those with the lowest white
population." Id. The study then compared the quartile with the highest white population
(the "white community") with the quartile with the lowest white population (the "minority
community"). Id.
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greatest white population were over 500% higher than penalties
at sites with the greatest minority populations, averaging
$335,566 in the white areas and only $55,318 in the minority ar-
eas.15 Lower average penalties for minority communities were
also found in federal enforcement cases under the Clean Water
Act (28% less), Clean Air Act (8% less) and Safe Drinking Water
Act (15% less), and in cases enforcing violations of multiple stat-
utes (306% less).' 6 Only in cases filed under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CER-
CLA" or "Superfund") against those who have not complied with
orders or other requirements to clean up old waste sites were pen-
alties in minority areas higher than in white areas (9% higher).' 7
The average penalties imposed for violations of all the environ-
mental laws was $153,067 in white areas compared with $105,028
in minority areas.'"
Examining the influence of income, the study found that the av-
erage penalties imposed for violations of all environmental laws
was $146,993 in high income communities, and only $95,664 in
low income communities. 19 However, the pattern varied depend-
ing on the particular environmental law. In Clean Water Act
cases, penalties in low income communities were 91% lower than
those in high income communities, and in multimedia cases, aver-
age penalties were $315,000 in high income areas compared to
$18,000 in low-income areas. 20 In four of the six types of cases
examined, facilities in low income communities actually paid
higher penalties. In RCRA cases, penalties in poorer areas were
3% higher than in areas with the highest median incomes; in
Clean Air Act cases, 29% higher; in Superfund cases 24% higher;
and in Safe Drinking Water Act cases, 63% higher. 21 The National
Law Journal concluded:
[T]he pattern of penalties varied so markedly depending on
the particular law the polluter is accused of violating that the
income of a community is not a reliable predictor of whether
15 Id. at S4.
16 Id.
17 Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S4.
18 Id. at S2.
19 Id. No explanation is provided of how a community is defined as "high income" or "low
income," although it appears to have been done by quartiles based on median income. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
1994]
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those who pollute it will be dealt with more harshly. On the
other hand, minority communities consistently saw lower av-
erage fines than white communities under every type of envi-
ronmental law except the Superfund law governing aban-
doned toxic waste sites where they came out slightly ahead.22
Although the National Law Journal report has been described
as the most comprehensive investigation to date on the disparity
of EPA's enforcement actions,23 the study's methodology has been
criticized. The study's arrangement of communities in quartiles
based on the percentages of white and minority residents resulted
in sites identified as "minority communities" having white popula-
tions of up to 84% in Superfund cases and 79% in enforcement
cases.24 This method of dividing populations was defended by the
authors of the study as being a common and accepted method for
studying populations, and also necessary because "more detailed
breakouts of minority share would have resulted in too few cases
or sites in each category."25 However, the study's methodology re-
sulted in some predominately white communities being labeled
"minority" communities.2 6
EPA's initial reaction to the National Law Journal study was to
"acknowledge the concerns, but question[ ] some of the ways the
data were interpreted and used."27 One of EPA's first acts was to
22 Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S4.
23 Lazarus, supra note 11, at 818 n.125.
24 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S4.
25 Id.
26 See Mary Bryant, Unequal Justice? Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics Revisited,
SONREEL NEWS (A.B.A. Sec. Nat. Resources, Energy, and Env't Law), SeptJOct. 1993, at
3; Lazarus, supra note 11, at 818 n.125. By way of comparison, the Environmental Equal
Rights Act of 1993, a bill pending in the U.S. House of Representatives, identifies an "envi-
ronmentally disadvantaged community" to include areas where the percentage of ethnic
and racial population is greater than either the percentage of the population in the state or
in the United States of all such individuals. H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7014(d)(1)(A) (1994).
27 Environmental Fines Lower, Cleanups Slower in Minority Communities, Law Journal
Charges, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1416, 1417 (1992); see also Lavelle &
Coyle, supra note 12, at S4. The EPA Deputy Administrator for Enforcement called the
focus on penalties "an unreliable point of departure" for studying equity. Id. EPA preferred
using the number of inspections at a facility or the amount of time between uncovering a
violation and the lodging of charges. Id.
Although EPA had issued an extensive report earlier in 1992 on environmental equity,
that report only briefly mentioned enforcement-related issues and did not address the pos-
sibility that the agency's own enforcement decisions could be discriminating against minor-
ities and low income persons. See U.S. E.P.A., ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR
ALL COMMUNITIES, WORKGROUP REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR 3-4, 27-29 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter EPA EQUITY WORKGROUP REPORT]; see also EMC WORKGROUP, U.S. E.P.A., ENVIRON-
MENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, SUPPORTING DOCUMENT (1992)
[Vol. 9:625
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hire a statistician to challenge the data. The statistician con-
cluded that the "allegations were not supported by the statistics
on which it relied, finding that the differences found for RCRA and
Clean Air Act violations and the differences in Superfund cleanup
methods were not statistically significant."28 Nevertheless, EPA
ultimately concluded that the findings of its statistician "does not
prove that the Agency is not discriminatory in its enforcement ef-
forts, merely that the Journal failed to demonstrate discrimina-
tion as a matter of fact. In any event, there is clearly a perception
that the Agency is biased that must be addressed."29
EPA's Region IX office recently completed a comparison of
RCRA penalty assessments in minority and non-minority areas.
The study reviewed administrative penalty assessments by the re-
gion in California, Arizona and Hawaii between 1987 and 1992.30
"Minority" areas were defined as those with an ethnic minority of
greater than 25% for Arizona and Hawaii and greater than 30%
for California.3 1
[hereinafter SUPPORTING DOCUMENT] (discussing evidence of disparate impact and some
problem areas within EPA programs, but not addressing disparate enforcement).
In response to the National Law Journal article, EPA established the Enforcement Man-
agement Council ("EMC"), a workgroup composed of legal and technical staff from EPA
headquarters and regional offices that was directed to examine the issue of equity in the
agency's enforcement actions and issue a report by the summer of 1993. See U.S. E.P.A.,
Responses by the Environmental Protection Agency to Questions by the United States Corn-
mission on Civil Rights on Environmental Equity and Civil Rights Enforcement, reprinted
in LOUISIANA ADviSORY Comm. To THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BATTLE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA ..... GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY AND THE PEOPLE 82,
89 (1993) [hereinafter LoUISIANA ADviSORY Comm. REPORT].
28 EMC Workgroup on Equity in Enforcement, Equity in the Enforcement of the Federal
Environmental Laws, 80 (undated draft) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
[hereinafter EMC Enforcement Workgroup Report]. At least one other reviewer has ques-
tioned whether the findings were statistically significant. See Bryant, supra note 26, at 4.
"Statistical significance reflects the margin of error in the results, and is stated in terms of
the percentage of the time the study's results would have occurred by chance alone." Id.
29 EMC Enforcement Workgroup Report, supra note 28, at 80.
30 U.S. E.P.A., REGION 9 EPA WASTE COMPLIANCE STuDY-FINAL DRAFT, passim (1994)
[hereinafter WASTE COMPLIANCE STUDY]. Thirty administrative penalties were analyzed in
California, eight in Arizona, and seven in Hawaii. Id. Nevada and Guam were excluded
from the analysis because no penalties were assessed by EPA in Nevada during the five-
year period and census data was unavailable for Guam. Id.
By way of comparison, the National Law Journal study reviewed 929 civil judicial penal-
ties resulting from either negotiated consent decrees or court judgments. See Lavelle &
Coyle, supra note 12, at S4. The National Law Journal noted the difference in fiscal year
1990 between the average size of the penalties resulting from judicial cases ($264,000 per
case) and those assessed administratively by EPA ($16,000 per case). Id.; see also supra
note 11 and accompanying text.
31 WASTE COMPLIANCE STUDY, supra note 30. The Region determined that "[t]hrough re-
search we were able to comfortably ascertain that 25% is the most commonly used national
figure to delineate between minority and non-minority areas." Id. The higher percentage
was used for California because it was found by the Region to be more demographically
632 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
EPA found that for the individual states as well as for the Re-
gion as a whole there was "no causal relationship between the per-
centage minority and the penalty amount assessed.... [Als mi-
nority population increases, there is no subsequent trend to
support that EPA penalizes less in minority areas."3 2 The Region
concluded that the results show that it does not discriminate in its
RCRA penalty policy application based on the degree of minority
population in the surrounding area.3 3 No attempt was made to de-
termine if differences in the income level of the surrounding -com-
munity had an impact on the penalty amounts assessed.
In response to the National Law Journal study, the Georgia En-
vironmental Protection Division reviewed its assessment of haz-
ardous waste fines.3 4 It found that, for fines assessed by the
agency for violations at eighty sites in Georgia from 1984 through
March 1993, the average fine collected in white areas was
$33,844, and the average in minority areas was $45,626.35 The re-
port also found that fines in lower income areas were larger than
those in higher income areas, averaging $40,794 in areas with an-
nual household incomes under $20,000, and $20,343 in areas with
incomes over $30,000.36 The state concluded that its enforcement
of hazardous waste laws has not shown any discrimination
against minority neighborhoods.
Other statistical evidence of possible unequal enforcement is
more circumstantial. A study by scientists at the Argonne Na-
diverse than other states. Id. As noted above, the National Law Journal study divided the
communities into quartiles and compared the quartile with the highest white population
with the quartile with the lowest white population. See supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
In California, the Region reviewed the racial compositions using 1990 census data at a 1/
4, 1/2, 1 and 4 mile radius from the penalized facility; in Arizona and Hawaii, 1 mile radii
analyses were completed. WASTE COMPLIANCE STuDy, supra note 30.
32 See Conclusions, in WASTE COMPLIANCE STuDY, supra note 30. The Region did a re-
gression analysis (a method that allows one to determine whether a causal relationship
exists to support a trend) using R-square and t-statistic methods for the regional and Cali-
fornia penalty data. Id. Because of the small universe of data for Arizona and Hawaii, the
Region simply ranked the penalty amounts to determine whether a trend existed or not. Id.
33 Id.
34 GA. ENV'T PROT. Div., GEORGIA DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, EPD Releases Informa-
.tion on Hazardous Waste Fines (1993) (pamphlet on file with author); see also State Report
Looks at Waste Site Fines, Finds No Discrimination in Minority Areas, [Current Develop-
ments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 284 (1993).
35 See Conclusions, in WASTE COMPLIANCE STUDY, supra note 30. The study used 1990
census tract information to determine the racial makeup and aveiage income of areas
within one-half mile of each site. Id. "Minority areas" were defined as those areas with
greater than 50% minority population. Id.
36 Id.
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tional Laboratory found that higher percentages of both African
Americans and Hispanics live in areas that are out of compliance
with federal air quality standards.37 Fifty seven percent of all
whites, 65% of African Americans, and 80% of Hispanics live in
counties with substandard air quality.3" That these areas are in
noncompliance is a reflection, at least in part, of a failure of EPA
to aggressively enforce air quality standards.3 9
Anecdotal evidence of unequal enforcement is widespread. Lax
government enforcement of restrictions on leaking underground
storage tanks,40 hazardous waste incineration,4 ' lead smelters,42
petro-chemical plant emissions,43 and the cleanup of the Anacos-
tia River in Washington, D.C., 4 have all been attributed to dis-
criminatory practices and policies of environmental agencies. It
has also been noted that EPA was quick to authorize governmen-
tal buyouts of the homes of residents living around the predomi-
nantly white Superfund sites at Love Canal and Times Beach, but
37 D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities Are Disproportion-
ately Exposed, EPA J., MarJApr. 1992, at 16, 16-17.
38 Id.
39 See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 818-19. The inability or unwillingness of EPA to en-
force federal pesticide laws has been cited as another example of unequal enforcement;
ninety percent of the farm workers in the United States are persons of color. See id. at 819
& nn.132-33; Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez, Farm Workers: Among the Least Pro-
tected, EPA J., MarJApr. 1992, at 13-14; Hawley Truaz, Minorities at Risk, ENviRONMEN-
TAL ACTION, JaniFeb. 1990, at 19, 20-21.
40 See Daniel O'Connor, Leaking Underground Storage Tanks and Urban Neglect, RACE,
POVERTY & THE ENV r, Winter/Spring 1993, at 31, 32 (review of government enforcement
files lead to conclusion that suburban gas stations with leaking underground storage tanks
were given more attention by California Water Quality Board than leaking tanks at inner
city sites).
41 See ROBERT D. BuuL w, DUMPING IN DIXE: RACE, CLAss, ADm ENVIRONMENTAL QuAL-
rry 66-68 (1990) (officials in Louisiana were charged with ignoring longstanding complaints
of poor, minority community until state official finally visited area and experienced toxic
odors coming from nearby hazardous waste incinerator).
42 See Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the United States, 18 YALE
J. INT'L L. 319, 332-33 ("The city finally took action after a series of articles on lead ap-
peared in the local Dallas newspapers .... Dallas was clearly lax in its enforcement of
health and land use regulations in the African American community."); Poor, Minorities
Want Voice in Environmental Choices, CONG. Q., Aug. 21, 1993, at 2257. ("Local residents,
who are predominantly poor and Hispanic, last March sued the federal and state govern-
ment, charging the bureaucrats were intentionally lax in cleaning up the toxic aftermath
because West Dallas is a minority community.").
43 See John Gonzalez, Texas Groups Force Cleanups by Pulling the Right Strings, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 1, 1993, at Al. ("'There is no doubt in my mind that the
reason we have been so slow in solving this is that it hasn't affected the population as a
whole, only the minority community,' Odessa NAACP President Gene Collins said.").
44 See Charles Lee, Developing Working Definitions of Urban Environmental Justice,
RACE, POVERTY & THE ENVIRONMENT, Winter/Spring 1993, at 3, 4 (during efforts to make
Potomac River pristine, Anacostia River, which runs through minority and low income
neighborhoods of Washington, was ignored).
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has been unwilling to authorize a buyout in the African-American
town of Triana, Alabama.4"
B. Unequal Cleanup of Waste Sites
The September 1992 National Law Journal study also ex-
amined EPA's responses under the Superfund program to aban-
doned toxic waste sites. All sites on EPA's National Priority List
("NPL") of Superfund sites were examined, except for sites for
which there were no available census information or no evidence
of nearby residential populations.46 The study found that sites in
minority areas took 20% longer to be placed on the NPL than sites
in white areas-white areas waited 4.69 years from the date of
discovery of the site until its listing on the NPL, while minority
areas waited 5.63 years.47
The study did find, however, that by the time the actual cleanup
of the site began, minority sites were only 4% behind the white
sites, 10.4 years compared to 9.9 years.48 But there were wide var-
iations among EPA's regional offices. In EPA's Midwest Region,
EPA took an average of 4.1 years longer to begin comprehensive,
long-term cleanups in minority areas; in the West, 3 years longer;
and in the Great Plains, 2.7 years.49
The National Law Journal also found that EPA chose less pro-
tective remedies at minority sites. Under section 121(a) of CER-
CLA, Congress directed EPA to prefer remedies that permanently
and significantly reduce the volume, toxicity or mobility of the
hazardous substances over remedies that do not involve such
treatment.5 0 The study found that at minority sites, EPA chose
"containment", the capping or walling-off of a hazardous waste
site, 7% more frequently than the permanent treatment method
45 See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 818 n.126 (citing Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix
Wright, The Politics of Pollution: Implications for the Black Community, 47 PHYLON 71
(1986)); see also Meeting on Environmental Equity Went Well, Representatives of
Poor,Minorities State, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 366, 367 (1992) (question-
ing U.S. Army Corps of Engineer's methods for appraising black neighborhoods eligible for
Superfund buyouts).
46 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S4. The final analysis included 1,177 of EPA's
1,206 NPL sites as of March, 1992. Id.
47 Id. at S2, S6.
48 Id.
49 Id. at S4, S6.
50 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a) (1988) (EPA is to select cleanup remedy utilizing permanent solu-
tions "to the maximum extent practicable").
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preferred by the law; at white sites, EPA ordered the preferred
treatment 22% more than containment.51
The study also found a difference between rich and poor commu-
nities in the pace of cleanup and in the permanence of the reme-
dies selected, but not as great as the differences between minority
and white communities. The time from discovery to listing on the
NPL is 10% slower for poor communities than for wealthy, com-
pared to the 20% longer it takes when comparing minority with
white sites.5 2 Comparing containment versus permanent treat-
ment of sites, the study found that EPA chose containment 35%
more frequently at high income sites and only 18% more fre-
quently at lower income sites.5 3
A 1990 study by Clean Sites sought to determine if potential
Superfund sites in rural poor counties were receiving the same
amount of attention from EPA as sites nationally. 4 The study
concluded that eligible rural poor sites were placed on the
Superfund NPL at half the rate of other sites. While 4% of the all
eligible sites55 end up being placed on the NPL, only 3.2% of sites
in rural counties and only 2.1% of sites in poor counties are on the
NPL.56 The significance of being placed on the NPL is that only
those sites are eligible for long term cleanup actions using federal
Superfund monies.57 Clean Sites found that, in contrast to the dif-
ferences in listing on the NPL, sites in rural poor counties were
receiving at least the same level of EPA attention for site inspec-
tions and emergency removal actions.58
51 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S2, S6.
52 Id. at S2, 84.
53 Id. at S2.
54 See CLEAN SrrEs, HAZARDOUs WAsTE SrrEs AND THE RURAL POOR: A PRELIMINARY As-
SESSMENT, passim (1990) [hereinafter CLEAN Srrs] "Rural poor counties" were designated
as those counties where, in 1986, there was no metropolitan area with a population greater
than 50,000 and where the average annual per capita income was at or below $9,320. Id. at
3. This designation included the 15% of counties in the United States with the lowest per
capita incomes. Id.
55 Id. Defined as the greater than 34,000 sites in the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Information System ("CERCLIS"), EPA's inventory of
sites at which hazardous substances have been stored, treated or disposed without a haz-
ardous waste permit. Id. at 7; see also Peter B. Prestley, The Future of Superfund, ABA J.,
Aug. 1993, at 62 (34,652 sites in CERCLIS as of June, 1991).
56 CLEAN SrrEs, supra note 54, at 48-49.
57 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(bXl) (1992). "Only those releases included on the NPL shall
be considered eligible for Fund-financed remedial action." Id. Any site in CERCLIS, even if
not on the NPL, is eligible for emergency removal, planning, or enforcement activities by
EPA. Id.
58 CLEAN SrrEs, supra note 54, at viii-ix, 45-46.
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Clean Sites speculated that one reason rural sites were less fre-
quently listed on the NPL was that one of the primary factors
used in evaluating sites for the NPL was the size of the population
affected by the release of hazardous substances.59 The authors of
the study could find no reason to explain why EPA was only half
as likely to place poor counties on the NPL.
A recent study by Rae Zimmerman analyzed the pattern of
Superfund cleanups in minority communities using the NPL
designation process and whether a record of cleanup decision has
been issued by EPA.60 The study first compared Hazardous Rank-
ing System ("HRS") scores for minority and low income popula-
tions with the average score for all Superfund NPL sites.6 ' The
findings showed that, on average, there was not a statistically sig-
nificant difference between the HRS scores in minority conmuni-
ties as compared to those for all NPL sites.6 2 Poverty was also not
found to yield a statistically significant result.6 3
The Zimmerman study also reviewed whether a Record of Deci-
sion ("ROD") had been issued for the site. 4 The higher the black
population is around the NPL site, the less likely it is that EPA
has yet issued a ROD; the higher the Hispanic population, the
more likely it is that the site already has a ROD; per capita in-
come was not significantly related to the existence of a ROD.65
Looking at subsets of populations, NPL sites in relatively poorer
communities with relatively high black populations tended to
have 20% fewer of their sites with RODs; a similar, but less
59 Id. To be placed on the NPL, a site must score sufficiently high on the "Hazard Rank-
ing System" ("HRS"). Hazardous Sites in Poor, Rural Counties Receive Less Attention Than
Other U.S. Sites, [Current Developments] Env't Rep (BNA) 1961 (1990). Prior to the issu-
ance of the revised HRS in 1990, the size of the affected population was often a determining
factor for listing sites. Id.
60 Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 Risx ANALYsis 649
(1993).
61 Id. at 659-60. The HRS is "the method used by EPA to evaluate the relative potential
of hazardous substance releases to cause health or safety problems, or ecological or envi-
ronmental damage." 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1993). If a site scores above 28.5, then it is eligible
for listing on the NPL. Id. at § 300.425(c) & app. A.
62 Zimmerman, supra note 60, at 660.
63 Id.
64 id. at 660-63. An ROD is the agency's decision as to the appropriate long-term cleanup
remedy for the site. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(4) (1993).
65 See Zimmerman, supra note 60, at 660. The lack of a ROD indicates that the site has
not advanced as far in EPA's cleanup process. Hence, a delay in issuing an ROD would
indicate a delay in beginning the final cleanup. The author postulated that the differences
in minority composition of communities with RODs seemed to have occurred during the
designation of the site on the NPL, rather than at the later ROD stage. Id. at 664.
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strong, correlation was found for sites in poor Hispanic communi-
ties.66 In looking at all NPL sites, Zimmerman also found that
RODs were more likely to have been issued where "controversy"
existed.67 However, the existence of controversy in low income mi-
nority communities was not associated with the signing of RODs,
although it did have that affect in communities with fewer
minorities.68
An analysis by John A. Hird of EPA Superfund cleanups found
that the pace of cleanup depended mostly on the site's potential
hazard, not on socioeconomic factors.69 Hird looked at NPL sites
and used three measures to determine the speed of cleanups. 70 He
then compared the pace of the cleanup with the economic and ra-
cial characteristics of the county in which the site was located.7 '
He found virtually no relationship between an NPL site reaching
a particular cleanup stage and the county's socioeconomic
characteristics."2
Two studies by EPA's Region II offer conflicting evidence of une-
qual cleanup of Superfund sites. A study in 1990 by Robert
Huang compared the amount of time spent in the initial phases of
the Superfund cleanup process and the demographics of communi-
ties around the sites.73 Huang found statistically significant rela-
tionships showing that waste sites in New York and New Jersey
progressed faster through the pre-remedial stages of the
Superfund process if the communities within a one-mile radius of
66 Id. at 660-61.
67 Id. at 661-62. "Controversy" was measured by the extent of media coverage and the
opinions of Superfund site managers. Id.
68 Id. at 662.
69 John A. Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund, 12 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 323 (1993).
70 Id. at 335-37. The three cleanup stages analyzed were: if the Remedial Investigation/
Feasibility Study ("RI/FS") had been started; if the ROD had been signed; and if a long-
term remedial action had begun. Id. at 335-36. The study reviewed the 788 sites that were
either proposed for listing or already listed on the NPL as of January 1, 1989. Id. at 331-32,
336.
71 Id. at 336. By way of comparison, Zimmerman's study focused on the geographic level
of "communities", representing the smallest formal level of political decisionmaking. Zim-
merman, supra note 60, at 653. The National Law Journal study defined the geographical
area by ZIP code, looking at persons residing in the same ZIP code as the facility or site. See
Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S4.
72 Hird, supra note 69, at 336-37.
73 ROBERT HUANG, ENTrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA REGION II EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OF-
FICE'S SUPERFUND EQurY STUY (1990). The study focused on the amount of time spent in
the pre-remedial phases, defined as the stages of site discovery, preliminary assessment,
site inspection, and hazardous ranking system calculation. Id, at 18.
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the site had higher household incomes.7 4 The study did not find a
relationship between the speed of the cleanup and the racial com-
position of the community.75
A more recent Region II study by Zimmerman found that the
socioeconomic characteristics of the communities within one mile
of NPL sites had only a negligible effect on the timing of the steps
in Region II's Superfund cleanup process. 76 Zimmerman's Region
II study compared the pace of cleanup activities with the sur-
rounding community's percentage of Hispanics, percentage of mi-
nority races, and income as portrayed by house value.77 The study
found a general absence of relationship between the timing of the
steps in the cleanup process and racial population, ethnic popula-
tion or income. 78 The study concluded that the timing of the steps
in Region II's cleanup process, once a site is placed on the NPL,
are largely internally driven by Superfund program timetables
and that socioeconomic characteristics only negligibly affect the
process.7 9 The results of Regions II's latest study are consistent
with the National Law Journal's finding that the pattern of the
Superfund cleanup enforcement was quite uneven across the
country, with cleanup actually beginning more quickly at minority
sites than at white sites in Region 11.80
C. Possible Causes of Unequal Enforcement
Additional empirical studies of possible unequal enforcement
are clearly needed to determine the presence or scope of any dis-
crimination and to help identify ways to address the inequality."'
The studies to date are few and, because of the complexity of the
74 Id. at 23. The study involved the 191 National Priority List sites in New York and
New Jersey but did not include Region II NPL sites in Puerto Rico. Id.
75 Id.
76 RAE ZIMmERMAN, AN ENmRONMENTAL EQuiTY STUDY FOR INACTIVE HAZARDOUS WASTE
SITES (1994).
77 Id. at 69, 71. The cleanup activities examined included the dates of: site discovery;
proposal to NPL; final listing on NPL; combined remedial investigation/feasibility study
initiation; combined remedial investigation/feasibility study completion; and record of deci-
sion. Id. at 51-68.
75 Id. at 72.
79 Id. at 85, 87.
80 Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S6.
81 Besides additional studies of penalty amounts and the rate and scope of Superfund
cleanups, other indicators of enforcement distribution and effectiveness that have been
suggested include: frequency of inspections; amount of time between when the violation is
discovered and when enforcement action is taken; and the frequency and scope of the
agency's response to citizen complaints. See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S4.
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factors that might go into an agency's exercise of its enforcement
responsibilities, the factors that might influence a disparate im-
pact are many. 2 EPA recognizes the need for further study,83 but
has also acknowledged the need to act now to address the issue of
disparate enforcement. -Both EPA and U.S. Department of Justice
officials have repeatedly stated that their agencies will be di-
recting more of their enforcement resources to poor and minority
communities where persons are suffering disproportionate risk.84
82 For example, some of the variables that could also explain a difference in penalty as-
sessments between communities are: the strength of the evidence and law against the vio-
lator; the economic benefit enjoyed by the noncompliance; the ability of the violators to pay
the penalties; the use of non-penalty or injunctive relief in lieu of penalties; the degree of
community interest or pressure; the degree of political influence exerted by a community's
elected officials; the presence of anomalous high or low penalty assessments in the analy-
sis; the definitions of key terms defining the different groups and geographical areas com-
pared; the value of money over time; the general increase in penalty assessments over time;
and whether the penalty was assessed by the agency, or a court or entered upon consent of
the parties.
83 During the press briefing after the issuance of the President's Executive Order on En-
vironmental Justice, EPA Administrator Carol Browner stated that EPA has "undertaken
a project to look at the findings of [the National Law Journal] study to understand whether
in fact what the study suggested is occurring .... [I]t is a comprehensive analysis that we
are undertaking to ensure that we don't, in fact, have lower penalties being applied in
certain communities." EPA Administrator Carol Browner & Attorney General Janet Reno,
Press Briefing 4 (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with author).
In 1993, EPA identified two additional ongoing studies of its enforcement policies and
programs: a review by Region II to determine if affluent communities are more able to
speed up the Superfund cleanup process and an Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Re-
sponse ("OSWER') analysis to determine whether racial or socioeconomic inequities occur
in the RCRA enforcement process. Draft Memorandum from EMC Workgroup on Equity in
Enforcement to Enforcement Management Council passim (April 14, 1993) (on file with
author). A fact sheet for the unreleased Region II study states that socioeconomic charac-
teristics of the population near a site showed no apparent influence on the timing of the
cleanup process. See U.S. E.P.A., REGION II, FACT SHEET-U.S. EPA REGION 2 SUPERFUND
EQUITY STUDY (1994) (final report on study not released to public). OSWER is analyzing
300 Superfund sites to determine if certain phases of the cleanup and certain types of
cleanup remedies vary because of race or income; that study will likely be completed by the
end of 1994. Telephone Interview with Jim Maas, Superfund Revitalization Office, OSWER
(Mar. 28, 1994).
In addition to studies by EPA of its own enforcement actions, it is very important that
independent studies be undertaken on the impact of the states' enforcement activities. Be-
cause state environmental agencies undertake the majority of enforcement actions and are
likely to have fewer policies or procedures in place to guide their enforcement decisions,
state enforcement decisions may well be more likely to exhibit bias or discriminatory im-
pact than EPA's well-established enforcement programs. See supra notes 6-7 and infra note
91 and accompanying texts.
84 See, e.g., Environmental Equity Warrants Consideration This Session of Congress,
Lawyers, Activists Say, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 3089 (1993); EPA, Con-
gress Eye Policy Reforms, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1662, (1994); Steven
A. Herman, EPA's Enforcement Priorities for Fiscal Year 1994, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT
J., Feb. 1994, at 3, 10-11; Viki Reath, DOJ Moves Forward With Environmental Justice
Plans, ENV'T WEEK, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1, 6.
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Even if the empirical data of unequal enforcement of environ-
mental laws is scarce and open to criticism, the conditions that
could give rise to discriminatory enforcement are present. The
causes of unequal enforcement are likely to be the same structural
causes that have been blamed for the general unequal distribution
of environmental hazards among minorities and low income com-
munities. Racist attitudes, lack of economic and political clout,
and lack of participation in government decisionmaking all play a
causal role.85 "To be sure, poor minority communities face some
fairly high barriers to effective mobilization against toxic threats,
such as limited time and money; lack of access to technical, medi-
cal or legal expertise; relatively weak influence in political or me-
dia circles; and cultural and ideological indifference or hostility to
environmental issues."8
in fact, the conditions that give rise to the discriminatory im-
pact of environmental hazards may be even greater when the gov-
ernment acts as enforcer, since few areas of the law invest more
discretion in agency employees or are more hidden from the pub-
lic's view and oversight than an agency's enforcement actions.8 7
The initial decision about which facilities to inspect and how often
to check for violations is generally left to the discretion of the
agency, although some statutes do provide for annual or biannual
inspections.8 8 Once the agency gets notice of a violation, it can
choose to take an informal response, such as a phone call, site
85 See Anthony R. Chase, Assessing and Addressing Problems Posed by Environmental
Racism, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 335, 344-46 (1993); Lazarus, supra note 11, at 806-25.
86 See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grass-
roots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KA. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 69, 71
(1991); see also Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty, and the Environment: The
Disadvantaged Face Greater Risks, EPA J., MarJApr. 1992, at 6, 7. "The residents tend to
be unaware of policy decisions affecting them; they are not organized; and they lack the
resources (time, money, contacts, knowledge of the political system) for taking political ac-
tion. Minority communities are at a disadvantage not only in terms of resources, but also
because of under-representation on governing bodies." Id.
87 See generally Bob Anderson, Documents Show More Inspections, Fewer Penalties Is-
sued by DEQ, SUNDAY ADVOCATE, Dec. 6, 1992, at BI (state environmental official decides
to cut back on number of penalties issued and refuses to issue penalty notices given to him
by enforcement personnel where there was no evidence in record that violations were
continuing).
88 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(d), (e) (1988)
(mandating inspections of facilities operated by state or local governments every year and
all other facilities no less than every other year); LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 30:2012(D) (West
Supp. 1994) (monitoring inspections of all permitted facilities shall be made at least once a
year). The Texas Air Control Board has instituted a risk-based target list of priority
sources for inspections. See TExAs ENVTL. EQUITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, TExAs ENVI-
RONMENTAL EQUITY & JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT 11 (1993).
[Vol. 9:625
1994] ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
visit, warning letter or notice of violations; an administrative rem-
edy, such as an administrative penalty assessment or compliance
order; a judicial action for penalties or injunctive relief; or a crimi-
nal prosecution.89 The process for cleaning up waste sites, and the
decisions regarding which, when, and how, provide similar oppor-
tunities for the exercise of discretion.90
While agencies often develop guidance documents to assist them
in determining the acceptable response or size of any penalty,91
those guidance documents are not binding on the agency 92 and are
designed with sufficient flexibility to allow the decisions to be in-
fluenced, whether intentionally or not, by the nature of the com-
munity in the area where the violator operates.9 3 The next section
89 See Wasserman, supra note 10, at 19.
90 See Paul R. Portney & Katherine N. Probst, Cleaning Up Superfund, 114 RESOURCES
2, 4 (1994). The authors state:
If one looks closely at the cleanup remedies EPA has selected at Superfund sites all
around the United States, it is hard to see any uniform pattern suggesting strict ad-
herence to the concept of permanence. Rather, remedy selection seems to depend at
least in part upon which EPA regional office is in charge of a given site, the amount of
press attention devoted to the site, and the extent of public involvement there.
Id.; EMC Enforcement Workgroup Report, supra note 28, at 24-25 (identifying areas of
discretion for agency officials in process of cleaning up Superfund sites).
91 See, e.g., U.S. E.P.A., A FRAMEwORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO PENALTY
ASSESSMENTS: IMPLEMENTING EPA's PocY ON CIVIL PENALTIES (1984); U.S. ENVTL. PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON THE TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE (T&A) ENFORCEMENT RE-
SPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT AIR POLLUTION VIOLATORS (SVs) (1992); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, THE CLEAN AIR ACT-CoMPLIANCE/ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE MANUAL (1987).
State environmental agencies are likely to have even fewer guidance documents, and
therefore exercise greater discretion in enforcement decisionmaking. See, e.g., Jocelyn F.
Olson, State Enforcement of Environmental Laws, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY-ENVI-
RONMENTAL LITIGATION 159, 179 (1990) (no formula used by Minnesota in determining how
much penalty is enough); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT:
PENALTIES MAY NOT RECOVER ECONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLATORS 12 (1994) [herein-
after U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE] (EPA's oversight of state penalty assessments is lim-
ited largely because EPA has not required states to adopt their own civil penalty policies);
see also In re BASF Corp., 538 So. 2d 635, 645 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (penalty assessed in
private and without documentation or reasons supporting amount), writs denied, 539 So.
2d 624 (La. 1989), 541 So. 2d 900 (La. 1989).
92 See, e.g., EPA Civil Penalty Policy, reprinted in, [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA)
21:0761, 0763 (1993).
The policies and procedures set out in this document and in the "Framework for Stat-
ute-Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessment", are intended solely for the guidance
of government personnel. They are not intended and cannot be relied upon to create
any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party in litigation with the
United States. The Agency reserves the right to act at variance with these policies and
procedures and to change them at any time without public notice.
Id.; see also U.S. E.P.A., RESOURCE CONSERVATION & RECOVERY ACT INSPECTION MANUAL 1-
3 (1989). ("The procedures are general and are not intended to be prescriptive, in deference
to Regional and State differences in approaches and procedures.").
93 "When it comes to implementation and policy, a lot of decisions appear to be based on
the politics of what's appropriate for that community. And low-income and minority com-
munities are not given the same priority, nor do they see the same speed at which some-
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discusses the extent to which the government, in spite of its often
broad prosecutorial discretion, can be forced to act more equitably
in its enforcement of environmental laws.
II. FORCING ADDITIONAL OR MORE EQUITABLE GOVERNMENT
ENFORCEMENT
It is the government, in the first instance, that has the responsi-
bility to ensure compliance with environmental laws. Govern-
ment also has a responsibility to ensure that its enforcement of
environmental laws does not discriminate against minority or low
income communities.9 4 Where environmental agencies do not ap-
pear to be enforcing environmental laws sufficiently or in an equal
manner, at least three different types of legal remedies are avail-
able under existing laws: civil rights laws; forcing the government
to undertake mandatory enforcement duties; and challenging in-
adequate government enforcement actions.
A. Using Civil Rights Remedies
An often discussed remedy to environmental discrimination is
civil rights lawsuits. 5 The initial litigation and scholarly discus-
thing is perceived as a danger and a threat .... ." Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S4
(quoting Professor Robert D. Bullard); Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory
Enforcement: A Review of EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18
ENVTL. L. 683 (1988) (chronicling ability of EPA officials to slow or stop enforcement of
hazardous waste laws); Lazarus, supra note 11, at 816-18 (detecting violation and subse-
quent decision to bring enforcement action are not controlled by legislature, but by "extra-
legal" variables that can be influenced by community members).
The General Accounting Office has been very critical of EPA's practice of often signifi-
cantly reducing penalty assessments, even below the economic benefit of noncompliance,
without adequate documentation or justification for the reduction. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNT.
ING OFFICE, supra note 91, at 1-2.
94 EPA's Deputy Administrator for Enforcement stated: "We want to guarantee that no
segment of society is bearing a disproportionate amount of the consequences of pollution."
Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S4.
95 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 85, at 353-58; Pamela Duncan, Environmental Racism:
Recognition, Litigation, and Alleviation, 6 TuL. ENVTL. L. REv. 317, 341-53 (1993); Robert
M. Frey, Environmental Injustice: The Failure of American Civil Rights and Environmental
Law to Provide Equal Protection from Pollution, 3 DicK. J. ENvrL. L. & POL'y 53, 71-77
(1993); Lazarus, supra note 11, at 827-42; Carolyn M. Mitchell, Environmental Racism:
Race as a Primary Factor in the Selection of Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
176, 181-87 (1993); Jane Perkins, Recognizing and Attacking Environmental Racism,
CLEARINGHOUSE REv., Aug. 1992, at 389, 389-90 Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A
Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REv. 271, 290-97, 300-05 (1992);
R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stigmatic and Racial
Injury, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 777, 791-99 (1991); Edward P. Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein'
Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument For
Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VANDERBILT L. REv. 937, 979-88 (1993); Leslie
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sion has focused primarily on claims that the government's action
in approving the siting of a facility violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. To date, federal Equal Protection law-
suits have not been successful in remedying environmental
discrimination.9 6
The failure of Equal Protection claims has resulted primarily
because of the difficulty of proving intent.97 To prove a claim of
racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, a plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant possessed a racially discrimina-
tory intent or purpose; discriminatory impact alone is insuffi-
cient.98 Under Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.," a plaintiff may use circumstantial
evidence, including statistical proof, to give rise to an inference of
intent. Nevertheless, the environmental discrimination cases that
have sought to prove intent through the use of statistics showing a
disparate impact on minorities have not been successful. 100
Although it has been suggested that the equal protection guaran-
tees in state constitutions may offer more protection and may ease
the difficulty of proving intent,'0 1 thus far, no plaintiff has been
able to prove that a discriminatory environmental decision vio-
lated his or her right to equal protection under either federal or
state law.
Ann Coleman, Note, It's the Thought that Counts: The Intent Requirement in Environmen-
tal Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 447, 458-71 (1993); Kelly Michele Colquette & Eliza-
beth A. Henry Robertson, Note, Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and
Commendations, 5 TUL. ENvrL. L. REv. 153, 198-205 (1991); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Reme-
dying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv., 394, 408-21 (1991); Naikang Tsao, Note,
Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory
Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 366, 405-17 (1992).
96 See Reich, supra note 95, at 290 ("[Flederal law has generally proven inadequate to
deal with environmental race discrimination."); Frey, supra note 95, at 71 ("No plaintiff has
prevailed using a civil rights argument to stop a proposed siting decision viewed as discre-
tionary."). But see Stephen C. Jones, EPA Targets 'Environmental Racism', NAT'L L.J., Aug.
9, 1993, at 28 ("Although no plaintiff has succeeded in proving discriminatory intent in an
environmental justice setting, the decisions to date suggest that it may not be impossible.").
97 See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 830-33; Reich, supra note 95, at 290-91; Godsil, supra
note 95, at 410-11.
98 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).
99 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977).
100 See, e.g., RISE v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.
1992); E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. South-
west Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-
768-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982).
101 See Reich, supra note 95, at 301-05; Tsao, supra note 95, at 394-99; see also TExAs
CTR. FOR PO"CY STUDIES, Toxics IN TExAs & THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 49
(1993).
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A promising civil rights option that is beginning to be used is
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.102 Under Title VI, "no per-
son in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the ben-
efits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."10 3 The term "Fed-
eral financial assistance" is not defined in Title VI, but has been
broadly defined by EPA to include any federal grant or cooperative
agreement, loan, contract, or other arrangement by which the fed-
eral agency provides financial assistance. 04 Because EPA and
other federal agencies that play a role in protecting public health
and the environment have provided extensive assistance to state
and local governments, this threshold requirement will often be
present when seeking to challenge an enforcement decision of a
state or local environmental agency. 10 5
Although the limitation in Title VI to programs receiving fed-
eral financial assistance may restrict the ability to use Title VI
directly against EPA,'0 6 federal environmental laws provide for a
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). For a discussion of the use of Title VI to address environ-
mental discrimination, see James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Envi-
ronmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125
(1994).
103 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). "[T]here is no authority for including low income or eco-
nomically disadvantaged persons within the ambit of § 2000d." Bronson v. Board of Educ.,
550 F. Supp. 941, 959 (S.D. Ohio 1982). The proposed Public Health Equity Act is patterned
after Title VI and would specifically prohibit discrimination in federally-assisted programs
and activities relating to exposures to hazardous substances but is also limited to discrimi-
nation on the ground of race, color or national origin. See S. 1841, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994).
104 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.25 (1992).
105 See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 835 & nn.215-19 (federal grants to state governments
made up 46% of state environmental budgets for air programs, 33% for water programs,
and 40% for hazardous waste). EPA's 21 assistance programs are listed in 40 C.F.R. pt. 7,
app. A (1992).
EPA has acknowledged the applicability of Title VI to the environmental decisions of
agencies and programs that receive financial assistance from EPA. See LouisIANA ADvi-
SORY Comm. REPORT, supra note 27, at 91-92 ; Stephen C. Jones, Inequities of Industrial
Siting Addressed, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 1993, at 20; see also Lazarus, supra note 11, at 836-
38.
106 There is a split of authority on whether a private cause of action exists under Title VI
directly against a federal agency where the agency is accused of acting in concert with the
recipient. Compare Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 929 (1984) and Community Bhd. of Lynn, Inc. v. Lynn Redev. Auth., 523 F. Supp.
779, 782 (D. Mass. 1981) (plaintiffs cannot enforce Title VI against federal agency) with
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 737-40 (7th Cir. 1971) and Little Earth of United
Tribes v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 584 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (D. Minn. 1983)
and JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CrviuL RIGHTS ACTIONS 17-4 to 17-5 (1993)
("The statute is applicable to discrimination by the pertinent federal authority as well as by
the recipient of the assistance.").
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transfer of permitting and enforcement authority to state and lo-
cal governments. 10 7 Generally, where states have had the oppor-
tunity to take over the permitting and enforcement of federal envi-
ronmental laws, they have elected to assume that authority.'08 In
fact, the majority of environmental enforcement actions are taken
by state agencies, not by EPA.' °9
The major benefit of using Title VI is that it provides a means to
avoid the difficult burden of showing intentional discrimination.
In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court held that Title VI could be
violated if the actions of the funding recipient had a discrimina-
tory effect, even though no purposeful design was present.110 Sub-
sequent Court decisions have clarified that if an agency has
promulgated regulations that prohibit discriminatory effects, then
a plaintiff need only prove discriminatory impact if the suit is
seeking only to enforce the agency regulations."'
EPA's Title VI regulations provide that any program or activity
receiving EPA assistance shall not, on the basis of race, color, or
national origin, deny a person any service, aid, or other benefit of
the program or subject a person to separate treatment in any way
107 LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 8.02[1] (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 1990).
The only federal enforcement programs not delegable are the Toxic Substances Control Act
and portions of the Clean Air Act's mobile source emissions control program. Id. Even
where a state is authorized to administer a federal program, EPA retains the authority to
take its own direct enforcement action against any person in violation of the act. See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1988) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3 (1988) (Safe Drinking
Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(aX2) (1988) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. 7413(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (Clean
Air Act).
The Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, Clean Air Act, and Superfund treat In-
dian tribes as states, thereby giving tribes the opportunity to assume primary enforcement
responsibility of federal environmental laws on tribal lands. See David F. Coursen, Tribes
as States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and Enforce Federal Environmental Laws
and Regulations, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,579, 10,580-82 (1993); Judith V.
Royster, Environmental Protection and Native American Rights: Controlling Land Use
Through Environmental Regulation, 1 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 89, 94 (1991).
108 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 8 (J. Gordon Arbuckle et al. eds., lth ed. 1991).
109 See More Money Received in Penalties Than Ever, supra note 4, at 354. In Fiscal Year
1992, state environmental agencies referred 574 civil cases to state attorney generals,
while EPA referred 361 to the Department of Justice. Id. In that same year, states initiated
8,643 administrative enforcement actions; EPA initiated 3,667. Id.
110 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
III See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983). The plaintiff
has the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of discrimination, but once the plaintiff
has met its burden of going forward with evidence proving discriminatory effect, the bur-
den of going forward shifl to the defendant to prove or to articulate a nondiscriminatory
justification for the challenged action. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 491 F.
Supp. 290, 314-15 (D.C. Del. 1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). If the defendant
produces evidence showing a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden of going forward shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that the reason given is a pretext. Id.; see also Larry P. v. Riles,
793 F.2d 969, 981 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984).
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relating to receiving services or benefits.' 12 The regulations fur-
ther provide that a recipient of federal aid shall not use criteria or
methods of administering its program that have the effect of sub-
jecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or
national origin.1 13 Where the recipient of EPA financial aid has
previously discriminated, the recipient shall take affirmative ac-
tion to provide remedies to those who have been injured by the
discrimination." 4
Any person who believes he or she has been discriminated
against may file a complaint at any EPA office within 180 days of
the alleged discriminatory act." 5 EPA's Office of Civil Rights will
review the allegations and either accept or reject the complaint. 116
EPA first attempts to resolve the complaint by informal means
but, if that is not possible, EPA will begin its complaint investiga-
tion." 7 Title VI also provides a private cause of action in federal
court against the recipient to enforce the regulations without hav-
ing to first exhaust available administrative remedies."18
Although as many as nine administrative complaints under Ti-
tle VI have been filed with EPA alleging discrimination in the im-
plementation of state environmental programs, no complaint has
alleged discrimination in the enforcement of environmental
laws. 1 9 Instead, the complaints have challenged permit decisions
and the use of sewage treatment grant monies. 120 Where evidence
is available that indicates a state or local government is enforcing
its environmental laws in a discriminatory fashion and where that
state has received federal financial assistance for its environmen-
112 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(a)(1), (4) (1992).
113 Id. § 7.35(b) (1992). The regulations further prohibit a recipient from choosing a site
or location for a facility that has the purpose or effect of subjecting persons to discrimina-
tion. Id. § 7.35(c).
114 Id. § 7.35(aX7).
115 Id. § 7.120(a), (b).
116 Id. § 7.120(d)(1).
117 If the complainant believes that the agency's resolution of the Title VI complaint was
incorrect or unlawful, then the agency's final decision can be appealed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-2 (1988). See S.E. Chicago Comm'n v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 488 F.2d
1119, 1129-31 (7th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161-63 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
118 See Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir.
1989); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 425-26 (7th Cir. 1986); Chowdhury v. Read-
ing Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 320-22 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229
(1983); Perkins, supra note 95, at 389-90 & n.6.
119 Telephone Interview with Suzanne E. Olive, Deputy Director, EPA Office of Civil
Rights (March 25, 1994).
120 Id.
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tal programs, Title VI would be available to remedy the discrimi-
nation. By way of comparison, cases have been brought under Ti-
tle VI alleging that the government authority provided less police
protection to a minority neighborhood.' 2'
Title VI also provides a private cause of action directly against
the recipient. 122 A majority of the Supreme Court in Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission held that a private cause of ac-
tion was available, although the division of opinions appeared to
limit such an action to declaratory and injunctive relief unless in-
tent was shown. 123 At least one commentator believes that the
Court's recent decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools124 means that "a damage remedy is now generally avail-
able for title VI violations, even absent a showing of discrimina-
tory intent."125
Title VI does expressly provide for the remedies of termination
or refusal to grant or continue financial assistance and "any other
means authorized by law."'2 6 Similarly, EPA's regulations provide
that the agency may use any means authorized by law to obtain
compliance from the financial recipient, including a referral of the
matter to the Department of Justice for prosecution. 127
121 See Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 882 F.2d at 1017 (violation of
civil rights when a police department fails to respond to calls from a neighborhood because
of racial makeup of community). In Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla.
1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983), and Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp.
1363, 1376 (M.D. Fla. 1978), the courts found that the towns had violated Title VI because
the evidence showed that they had provided inferior municipal services, such as street
maintenance, sewerage, and parks, to Black residents.
122 There has been at least one environmental discrimination suit filed under Title VI
alleging that local, state, and federal agencies created and refused to remedy hazardous
lead emissions from a lead smelter in West Dallas. See Western Dallas Coalition for Envtl.
Justice v. United States, No. CA-3-91-2615-R (N.D. Tex.); LAWYERS COMM. FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER LAw, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CASES: CASES INVOLVING CHALLENGES TO EN-
VIRONMENTAL DECISIONS THAT RAISE CLAIMS OF RACE OR NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
18-20 (1993).
123 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Four Justices held that Title VI provided a private cause of
action for compensatory relief upon a showing of discriminatory intent or effect. Id. at 615-
34, 635-45 (Justices Marshall, Stevens, Brennan & Blackmun). A fifth Justice agreed that
Title VI provided a private cause of action for both intentional and effects discrimination,
but stated that a damage remedy was only available where intent was shown. Id. at 593-
603 (Justice White).
124 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
125 Lazarus, supra note 11, at 836.
126 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988).
127 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a) (1992). The regulations include the remedies of annulling,
suspending or terminating EPA assistance, id. § 7.130.(b), and also refer to recipients tak-
ing steps for achieving compliance, id. § 7.115(c), (d), and taking affirmative action to pro-
vide remedies to those who have been injured by the recipient's previous discrimination, id.
§ 7.35(a)(7).
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Therefore, Title VI provides a means to address discriminatory
enforcement by state environmental agencies that receive federal
assistance. Because an injured party may invoke the protection of
Title VI by merely filing a complaint with EPA within 180 days of
the discriminatory act, Title VI also provides an easy means to
raise the issue, although the remedies available under an admin-
istrative complaint are limited and the result of the complaint
may depend a great deal on the zeal and thoroughness of EPA's
investigation and handling of the complaint.
B. Forcing Government Compliance With Enforcement and
Cleanup Duties
Citizens adversely affected by pollution or waste sites often
want government agencies to be forced to take some action to rem-
edy their plight. When the issue is whether or not the government
must take enforcement action against a particular violator or to
clean up a particular waste site, agencies often claim that they are
invested with discretion to decide when and how to use their en-
forcement resources. The availability of such discretion is not ab-
solute, however, and means are available to force government
agencies to comply with legislatively mandated enforcement and
cleanup duties.
1. Challenging the Decision Not to Take Enforcement Action
In Heckler v. Chaney,128 the Supreme Court set forth the gen-
eral rule that "an agency's decision not to take enforcement action
should be presumed immune from judicial review."129 The Court
explained that it is for the agency, not the court, to decide the com-
Within the time period when EPA is reviewing an application for financial assistance,
EPA's Office of Civil Rights is to determine whether the applicant is in compliance with
EPA's nondiscrimination regulations. Id. § 7.110(a). EPA's Office of Civil Rights may also
periodically conduct compliance reviews of any recipient's programs or activities. Id.
§ 7.115(a). To date, the Office of Civil Rights has only performed pre-award compliance
reviews of sewage treatment construction grants, not to determine if an applicant's permit-
ting or enforcement activities were discriminating against any persons. Telephone Inter-
view with Suzanne E. Olive, Deputy Director, EPA Office of Civil Rights (March 25, 1994).
However, the Office of Civil Rights intends to expand its pre-award compliance reviews and
will likely include questions relating to discrimination in the enforcement of state or local
environmental laws. Id. The Office of Civil Rights has not yet performed a periodic compli-
ance review of any state or local environmental program to determine if the applicant's
enforcement activities were discriminatory. Id.
128 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
129 Id. at 832.
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plicated balance of whether a violation has occurred, how the
agency should use its limited resources, and whether a particular
enforcement action best fits within the agency's policies.'1 0 Yet, an
agency's refusal to take enforcement action is not always unre-
viewable. "Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforce-
ment power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or
by otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate
among issues or cases it will pursue." 3 1 In fact, the Court has
found that an agency does have a nondiscretionary duty to take
enforcement action.132
Citizen suit provisions in federal environmental statutes pro-
vide that any citizen may file suit against EPA where there is an
alleged failure to perform an act or duty which is not discretion-
ary.1 33 However, attempts to force EPA to take an enforcement
action in a particular case, on the theory that EPA has a nondis-
cretionary duty to take such action, have generally been
unsuccessful.
Under the Clean Water Act, if the Administrator of EPA finds
that any person is in violation of certain provisions of the Act, the
Administrator: 1) "shall issue an order"; 2) "shall bring a civil ac-
tion"; or 3) "shall notify the person in alleged violation," and, if the
state does not commence an appropriate enforcement action,
"shall issue an order.., or shall bring a civil action."' 34 A majority
of courts have held that because the Administrator's finding of a
130 Id. at 831-32. The Court also noted that Section 701(aX2) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988), excepted from judicial review action "committed to
agency discretion by law". Id. at 828-32.
131 Id. at 833. The Court noted that it was not holding that claims of a violation of consti-
tutional rights were unreviewable, id. at 838, nor was it reviewing a situation where an
agency has adopted a policy that amounts to an abdication of its statutory enforcement
responsibilities. Id. at 833 n.4.
132 See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1975) (reviewing section 482 of
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982), which provides
Secretary of Labor "shall investigate" complaints of union election irregularities and "shall
... bring a civil action" if Secretary finds probable cause).
133 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988) (Toxic Substances Control Act); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(aX2) (1988) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(aX2) (1988) (Safe Drinking Water
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(aX1XC) (1988) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(aX2) (1988) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11,046(aXl)(B)
(1988) (Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). Section 706(1) of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1988), also provides federal courts with the
authority to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," and 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1988) provides district courts with jurisdiction over any mandamus action to
compel an agency to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
134 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1), (3) (1988).
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violation is a precondition to the requirement that the Adminis-
trator "shall" bring an enforcement action, and because there is an
absence of language indicating a duty on EPA to make that find-
ing or to investigate every citizen complaint, EPA's enforcement
duties under the Clean Water Act are not mandatory and a citizen
cannot force EPA to take enforcement action against a particular
facility or person. 135 However, the argument has been made that
although Congress gave EPA complete discretion to decide
whether or not to institute a judicial enforcement action, EPA
does have a duty to issue administrative compliance orders for
some violations and EPA's failure to act should be reviewed by the
court under the arbitrary or capricious standard.
136
The Clean Air Act provides that if the Administrator of EPA
finds certain violations, the Administrator "shall" notify the per-
son and the state of the violations.137 However, Congress again
conditioned any obligation to enforce on a finding of violation by
EPA and also chose to use the discretionary term "may" to de-
scribe the list of enforcement actions that follow notification to the
state and violator.' 38 As a result, the majority of courts have found
that, as with the Clean Water Act, EPA is not obligated under the
Clean Air Act to take enforcement action in any particular case.'
3 9
135 For the majority view, see Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1987); Harmon
Cove Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Marsh, 815 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1987); State Water Control
Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1977); Zemansky v. EPA, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1447 (D. Alaska 1986); National Wild-
life Fed'n v. Ruckelshaus, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1776 (D.N.J. 1983); Caldwell v. Gurley
Refining Co., 533 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Ark. 1982). For the minority view, see Greene v.
Costle, 577 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D. Tenn. 1983); South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander,
457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978); Rivers Unlimited v. Costle, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1681
(S.D. Ohio 1978); Illinois v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. Ill. 1977); United States v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975).
136 See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescrip-
tion for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 202,
242-53, 257-58 (1987).
137 See 33 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1), (2) (1988 & Supp IV 1993).
138 Id.; see also id. § 7413(aX3) (if EPA finds any person has violated certain provisions,
Administrator "may" take administrative, civil, or criminal enforcement action).
139 For the view that EPA has no duty to initiate enforcement action, see Council of
Commuter Org. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1982); City of Sea-
brook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1981); Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172
(6th Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976);
Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area Coalition v. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 705 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 524 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 683 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1982); New England
Legal Found. v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd in part, 632 F.2d 936 (2d
Cir. 1980), 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981); New Mexico Citizens v. Train, 6 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2061 (D.N.M. 1974). For cases finding that the act of issuing a notice of violation is
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The enforcement language in RCRA provides that whenever the
Administrator determines that any person has violated the act,
the Administrator "may issue an order" or "may commence a civil
action."14° Although there are no reported cases on whether this
language imposes a duty to enforce, because of the use of the term
"may", the language in RCRA does not appear to clearly withdraw
discretion from the agency or to provide guidelines for the exercise
of the agency's enforcement power. 14 1
The Safe Drinking Water Act requires that if the Administrator
of EPA finds that a public water system in a state with primary
enforcement authority is out of compliance, the Administrator
"shall" notify the state and the system and, if the violation contin-
ues beyond thirty days, "shall" issue an order or commence a civil
action.' 42 Similarly, where EPA has not delegated the program to
a state, if the Administrator finds a violation of the drinking water
regulations, EPA "shall" issue an order or commence a civil ac-
tion. 1 43 Thus, under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA does have
a mandatory duty to take enforcement action, but once again, only
if the Administrator first finds that a public water system is not in
compliance with drinking water regulations.
CERCLA,4' the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"),145 Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"),' 46 and
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
("EPCRTKA7)147 all have enforcement language that either prem-
ises any responsibility to act on a prior finding of violation by the
not discretionary, see West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976); Wisconsin Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co.,
395 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
At one time, the Clean Air Act contained language stating that the Administrator "shall"
commence a civil action whenever a major source of air pollution violates certain provi-
sions. However, the additional language "as appropriate" was inserted after the term
'shall" during the 1990 amendments and has weakened any claim of a mandatory duty to
file suit. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
140 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)(1) (1988).
141 See generally Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833-34.
142 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(1) (1988).
143 Id. § 300g-3(a02).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9660a (1988).
145 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988).
146 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136w-3 (1988).
147 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,049 (1988).
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Administrator or describes EPA's responsibility to act through use
of the discretionary term "may."1
48
Therefore, the ability to require EPA to take enforcement action
in a particular case is limited. Although under the Clean Water
Act and Safe Drinking Water Act a finding of a violation means
that EPA "shall" take some enforcement action, courts have gener-
ally been unwilling to hold that EPA has a nondiscretionary duty
to make a finding of violation whenever evidence of a violation is
present.
There are instances, however, where Congress has spoken with
sufficient clarity to impose mandatory enforcement duties. For ex-
ample, under section 3007 of RCRA, EPA "shall commence" a pro-
gram to thoroughly inspect every hazardous waste facility "no less
often than every two years as to its compliance."' 49 In this in-
stance, Congress has set the enforcement priorities of the agency
and there is no need to presume that a failure of EPA to inspect a
facility at least annually is immune from judicial review.
An inability to challenge a particular enforcement decision does
not mean that a citizen is precluded from challenging a systematic
or widespread failure by an agency to undertake enforcement ac-
tion in a substantial category of cases.5 ° "Where agency recalci-
trance is in the face of a clear statutory duty or is of such magni-
tude that it amounts to an abdication of statutory responsibility,
the court has the power to order the agency to act to carry out its
148 Section 109 of CERCLA states that EPA "may" assess administrative penalties for
violations and "may" bring a civil action in U.S. District Court to assess or collect penalties.
42 U.S.C. § 9609(a)-(c) (1988).
TSCA requires EPA to take action when certain risks of injury are found, but only upon
an initial finding by the Administrator that such risk is present. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(a), (f),
2604(f), 2605(a) (1988). The authority of EPA to commence a civil action under TSCA is
conditioned by the use of the term "may", but any person who violates sections 15 or 409 of
TSCA "shall" be liable to the United States for a civil action which "shall" be assessed by
EPA by an order made on the record after a hearing. Id. § 2606(a), (a)(1), (a)(2)(A).
FIFRA provides that the Administrator "may" assess a civil penalty for violations of the
Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(1), (2) (1988). Where a delegated state program fails to enforce
the Act, EPA "may" act upon the complaint. Id. § 136w-2(a).
Under EPCRTKA, EPA "may" order facilities to comply with the act, "may" assess ad-
ministrative penalties, and "may" bring a civil action to enforce the act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11,045(a)-(d) (1988).
149 42 U.S.C. § 6927(eX1) (1988). RCRA imposes the same obligation to perform man-
datory annual inspections on states having an authorized hazardous waste program. Id.
150 Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CH. L.
REv. 653, 678-79 (1985); see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985). ("Nor do we
have a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has 'consciously and
expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its
statutory responsibilities.").
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substantive statutory mandates." 51 The reason is that such pat-
tern of nonenforcement by the executive branch is contrary to the
goals of the statute and the will of the legislature and, therefore, a
usurpation of the legislative function.' 52 Courts have even allowed
lawsuits seeking to require a federal agency to enforce its Title VI
regulations. 153 Although an agency may have discretion over the
exact means of enforcing Title VI, the agency could not avoid its
responsibility to enforce the statute. 154 Therefore, where it is al-
leged that an agency has altogether failed to enforce a particular
provision of a statute, a court should assume jurisdiction over an
action challenging that failure.1
55
Promising means of challenging an environmental agency's fail-
ure to enforce may be available under state citizen suit provisions
or in a mandamus action. As discussed above, most enforcement
actions are brought by state environmental agencies so the ability
to force states to take additional enforcement actions could help
alleviate any unequal enforcement. 156
A mandamus action is the traditional remedy available to com-
pel performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty by a public
official.' 57 In reviewing both mandamus and citizen suit actions,
some state courts have expressed the same reluctance as federal
courts to order enforcement actions in a particular case.158 An op-
151 Public Citizen Health Research v. Commissioner, Food & Drug Admin., 740 F.2d 21,
32 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(agency cannot consistently fail to enforce law).
152 See Sunstein, supra note 146, at 678.
153 See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
154 Id. at 1163 (while agency may decide between two alternative means of enforcing
Title VI, consistent failure to use either means is dereliction of duty reviewable in courts).
155 See generally Bob Marshall, The Trout Brief. Politicians Alarmed by Lawsuit, TIaEs-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 5, 1994, at D-8 (mandamus action filed over state
agency's refusal to enforce rules limiting commercial fishing of speckled trout).
156 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
157 See BLACK's LAw DIcTioNARY 961 (6th ed. 1990); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2731.01 (Baldwin 1990). ("Mandamus is a writ, issued in the name of the State to an
inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.").
In addition to the typical mandamus remedy, some state environmental statutes contain
citizen suit provisions that authorize a civil action against an agency for a failure to per-
form nondiscretionary duties. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412(2)(a)(1) (West 1991) (au-
thorizing citizen to sue to compel agency to enforce environmental laws and regulations);
WASH. Rzv. CODE § 70.105D.050(5) (West 1992) (any person may commence civil action
compelling agency to perform any nondiscretionary duty).
158 See, e.g., Ironbound Health Rights Advisory Comm'n v. Diamond Shamrock Chem.
Co., 523 A.2d 250, 254-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (citizen suit provisions do not
authorize citizen to compel state to take discretionary enforcement action); Ohio v. Locher,
283 N.E.2d 164, 166-67 (Ohio 1972) (refusing to issue writ of mandamus to compel water
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posing view would look to whether the legislature has defined the
state agency's duties to include the enforcement of environmental
regulations and conclude that "[a]lthough the method of enforce-
ment is discretionary, enforcement is not." 159
A recent and potentially far-reaching use of mandamus was in
the case of Gregory v. Fox.160 In that case, plaintiffs sued the Ari-
zona Department of Environmental Quality alleging that the
agency had violated its nondiscretionary duty to issue cease and
desist orders. to violators of state water pollution control laws and
regulations. Under Arizona law, the Department must annually
publish a list of all water pollution control facilities found to be in
violation of the law,' 6 ' and where the agency has reasonable cause
to believe that a person has violated the law, the agency shall is-
sue a cease and desist order.162
Under a consent decree, the state agreed that if its review of
self-monitoring and other compliance-related reports reveals any
violation or if the agency fails to receive a legally required submit-
tal from a water pollution facility, then the state "shall" send writ-
ten notice of the violation to the facility representative.' 6 3 If the
recipient of the written notice does not comply with a notice of
violation or enter into a consent order, the agency "will" issue
either a unilateral compliance order or pursue judicially imposed
penalties or injunctive relief.' The decree clarifies that no single
failure of the agency to comply with the decree or to address viola-
pollution control commissioner to enforce city's pollution ordinances); Clear Vue Acres
Homeowners Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 317 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (no duty of
state environmental agency to commence legal action against those who fail to comply with
agency order).
159 New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning v. Koch, 138 Misc. 2d 188, 191-92,
524 N.Y.S.2d 314, 317 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987) (refusing to dismiss complaint seeking
order compelling defendants to enforce statutes designed to address lead poisoning), aff'd,
139 A.D.2d 404, 526 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't 1988); see also Friends of Everglades, Inc. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 46 So. 2d 904, 912-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (interpreting
Florida statute to authorize suit to compel agency to enforce laws relating to protection of
natural resources), petition for review denied, 462 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1985); Busalacchi v.
Board of Zoning Adjustments, 535 So. 2d 481 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff is entitled to
seek mandamus against defendant compelling it to perform its ministerial duty of enforc-
ing regulations). But cf Wilkinson v. LaFranz, 574 So. 2d 403, 405 (La. Ct. App. 1991). The
court stated: "Because enforcement of zoning ordinances by public officers is clearly discre-
tionary, mandamus is not an appropriate remedy in this case." Id.
160 Gregory v. Fox, CV93-01458 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1993).
161 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-105(3), (4) (1988).
162 Id. § 49-142.A.
163 Consent Decree at 3-4, Gregory v. Fox, (CV93-01458) (Ariz. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 1994).
164 Id. at 5-6.
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tions at a single facility will constitute a violation of the decree.165
However, a pattern of repeated or frequent noncompliance "shall
constitute a violation of this decree."' 66
In the end, the ability to force an environmental agency to take
enforcement action depends on the extent to which the legislature,
or the agency itself through regulations,"6 7 has imposed a
mandatory duty on the agency. Particularly where a party is not
attempting to force the agency to take a specific enforcement ac-
tion and where the legislature has identified enforcement as a
duty of the agency, mandamus may be an available legal remedy
to compel an agency to take action, or to take additional action, to
address violations of environmental laws in a community.
2. Forcing the Cleanup of Waste Sites
EPA has clear obligations regarding the cleanup of waste sites,
and there are remedies available to force EPA to take cleanup ac-
tion. State cleanup statutes and implementing regulations may
likewise impose mandatory duties on state agencies that are en-
forceable through a mandamus or citizen suit action. 168
Under Section 105(d) of CERCLA, any person who is or may be
affected by a release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances from a waste site may petition EPA to conduct a prelimi-
nary assessment of the hazards associated with the release.' 69 If
EPA has not performed a preliminary assessment of the site, then
165 Id. at 6.
166 Id.
167 See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974). The Court stated: "where the rights of
individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures." Id.;
see also Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1986). ("[11t is elementary that
an agency must adhere to its own rules and regulations. Ad hoc departures from those
rules, even to achieve laudable aims, cannot be sanctioned ... for therein lie the seeds of
destruction of the orderliness and predictability which are the hallmarks of lawful adminis-
trative action.").
168 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 21E, § 3A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (setting timetables
and specifications for cleanup of abandoned waste sites); MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310,
§ 40:500 to 547 (remedial response action requirements) reprinted in [State Solid Waste-
Land Use] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1206:1013-1026 (1991); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.32(10e) (Calla-
ghan Supp. 1993) (requirements for remedial action at waste sites); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 173-340 to 360, reprinted in [State Solid Waste-Land Use] Env't Rep. (BNA). 1341:0753 to
0755 (1991) (selection of cleanup actions). See generally U.S. E.P.A., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE
SuPERFuND PRoGRAMs: 50-STATE STumY passim (1989).
169 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (1988). A preliminary assessment is a review of existing informa-
tion, including on-site or off-site reconnaissance, if appropriate, to determine if a release of
hazardous substances may require additional investigation or action. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5
(1993).
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EPA "shall", within twelve months of receipt of the request, either
complete the assessment or provide an explanation of why an as-
sessment is not necessary.1 7 0 The importance of a preliminary as-
sessment is that it is one means of determining if an emergency
removal action is needed; additionally, it is the first step in deter-
mining if a site should be placed on Superfund's NPL and be eligi-
ble for federally-funded cleanup of the waste.' 7 '
CERCLA also requires the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry ("ATSDR") to perform a health assessment for
each site on the NPL and for those sites proposed for listing on the
NPL. 72 The health assessment "shall be completed" no later than
December, 1988, for facilities proposed for the NPL prior to Octo-
ber 1986; for all sites proposed after October 1986, the assessment
shall be completed within one year of the date the site is proposed
by EPA.'7 3 Citizens or physicians may petition ATSDR for a
health assessment at any site, regardless of whether or not it is
listed or proposed for listing on the NPL.' 7 4 If a petition is submit-
ted and ATSDR does not initiate a health assessment, ATSDR
shall provide a written explanation of why a health assessment is
not appropriate. 75 Although ATSDR health assessments have
been severely criticized, 76 they are used by EPA to determine
what actions should be taken to reduce human exposure at a site
and may influence both EPA's choice of remedy and the speed with
which a cleanup is performed. 177
As mandatory responsibilities of EPA, the requirements to per-
form a preliminary assessment and health assessment are en-
forceable against EPA under CERCLA's citizen suit provision.
170 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1993); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.420(bX5Xiii) (1993). EPA is required
to eventually perform a preliminary assessment on all of the 34,000 or more sites in CER-
CLIS. 40 C.F.R. § 300.420(b) (1993).
171 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.420(b)(ii), (iv) (1993).
172 42 U.S.C. § 9604(iX6XA) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.400(f) (1993). A health assessment
includes a preliminary assessment of the potential risk to health posed by a site. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(6)(F) (1988).
173 42 U.S.C. § 9604(iX6)(A) (1988).
174 Id. § 9604(iX6)(B).
175 Id. CERCLA does not impose a time limit within which ATSDR must respond to a
petition, nor does the statute establish a time within which ATSDR must complete a health
assessment performed in response to a citizen or physician petition. Id.
176 See ENV oimmENAL HEALTH NEvwoRK & NATL Toxics CAMPAIGN FUND, INCONCLU-
SIVE BY DESIGN: WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH
at i (1992); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFmCE, SUPERFUND PUBLIC HEALTH ASSESSMENTS: IN-
COMPLETE AND OF QUESTIONABLE VALUE (1991).
177 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(G) (1988).
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Section 310 of CERCLA authorizes any person to commence a civil
action against EPA where there is an alleged failure to perform
any act or duty under CERCLA that is not discretionary. 178 If suc-
cessful, the citizen can request the court to order EPA to perform
the assessments and may recover attorney's fees and costs. 179
Attempts to force EPA to list a site on the NPL or to speed up its
timetable for making a cleanup decision are more problematic.
When EPA decides to list a site on the NPL, it must publish its
proposed decision in the Federal Register and solicit public com-
ments.1 8 0 In contrast, EPA's regulations do not call for any public
notice or opportunity to comment on the agency's decision not to
list a site on the NPL. Because the decision to list a site on the
NPL is characterized as rulemaking by EPA' and because the
decision not to promulgate a rule is reviewable by a court,18 2 the
decision not to place a site on the NPL should be a final agency
action reviewable under section 113(b) of CERCLA. l8 3 However,
because the decision not to place a site on the NPL is not publi-
cized, it would be difficult for an aggrieved citizen to learn of
EPA's decision. Even if a citizen were to learn of this decision,
review would be according to the deferential arbitrary and capri-
cious standard and would be based on the administrative
record. 184
Even more problematic is challenging the actual cleanup deci-
sion of the agency, such as on the grounds that it is not sufficiently
protective of public health. EPA's regulations provide opportuni-
ties for public participation in the agency process for making
cleanup decisions' 5 and require that EPA consider community ac-
178 Id. § 9659(a)(2). As with citizen suit provisions in other federal statutes, no action
may be commenced before 60 days following notice to EPA of the intent to sue. Id.
§ 9659(e). One court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review EPA's failure to perform a
mandatory health assessment at a Superfund NPL site. See Hanford Downwinders Coali-
tion, Inc. v. Dowdle, 841 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Wash. 1993).
179 See 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c), (f) (1988).
180 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(d)(5) (1993).
181 See id.
182 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
183 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1988).
184 See Kent County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 391, 393, 395-96 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Anne Arundel
County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 412, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
185 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1988) (requiring opportunities for public participation in
cleanup decisionmaking); 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(m) (1993) (participation during emergency
removal actions); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(c), (f)(3), (f)(6) (1993) (participation during longterm
remedial actions).
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ceptance when selecting the appropriate cleanup remedy. 18 6 Sec-
tion 113(h) of CERCLA, however, prohibits a challenge to EPA's
cleanup decision until after the cleanup is taken or secured.18 7
This prohibition on precleanup review has even been interpreted
to extend to situations where the plaintiffs alleged that they
would suffer irreparable injury were judicial review delayed until
after the cleanup was completed.' 88
Courts do have jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge
to the statute itself, rather than to EPA's administration of the
statute. 18 9 There is also authority for allowing a state agency to
file suit in state court if some aspect of the ongoing or proposed
cleanup would violate a state hazardous waste program. 90 Under
RCRA's citizen suit provisions, a citizen should have a similar op-
portunity to address any violations of RCRA at or during a CER-
CLA cleanup. 191
186 See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(2) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iiXI), (fXaXiXC) (1993).
187 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988); see, e.g., Shalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095-98 (7th Cir.)
("Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider challenges to remedial actions
that have not been 'taken' or 'secured'."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); see also William
J. Friedman, Judicial Review Under the Superfund Amendments: Will Parties Have Mean-
ingful Input to the Remedy Selection Process, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 187, 195-96 (1989).
188 See Boarhead Corp. v. EPA, 923 F.2d 1011, 1022 (3d Cir. 1991). The court professed:
"In Boarhead's situation post clean-up review is likely to be inadequate to redress harm
that occurred to archaeological and historical resources on Boarhead Farm during the
EPA's clean-up. Nevertheless, the statute's plain language eliminates Boarhead's opportu-
nity to obtain judicial review even in such circumstances." Id.; Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Ar-
kansas Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1993) (no juris-
diction even where plaintiffs alleged imminent endangerment to public health), petition for
cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1994) (No. 93-1124). But see Third Circuit Hears
Argument on Power to Enjoin Superfund Harm, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1099, 1099-1100
(1994) (at oral argument in United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech Inc., court expresses
hostility to government contention that courts have no power under CERCLA to enjoin
irreparable harm resulting from cleanup activities).
189 See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1514-17 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding juris-
diction to review claim that EPA's filing of lien notice under Section 107(1) of CERCLA
without hearing deprived plaintiffs of property without due process).
190 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575-80 (10th Cir. 1993) (state's efforts
to enforce its EPA-delegated RCRA authority to ensure cleanup is in accordance with state
laws and is not "challenge" to EPA response action), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). For
criticism of this decision, see Review Urged of Ruling Giving State Cleanup Role Within
U.S, Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 25,869, 25,870 (Jan. 5, 1994) (EPA character-
izes case as allowing collateral attack on CERCIA cleanup decision); Robert H. Foster,
Hazardous Waste Liability: Problem Solving Outside the Judicial Branch, Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 841 (1993) (case will result in additional substantive and procedural requirements
for cleanups); see also Louisiana v. Reilly, No. 92-274 (W.D. La. Apr. 6, 1992) (section
121(eX2) of CERCLA gives state right to bring action to enforce state waste disposal stan-
dards; section 113(h) does not prohibit enforcement action by state).
191 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578 (Congress did not prohibit RCRA
citizen enforcement suits where CERCLA response action is underway); Ouachita Parish
Police Jury v. American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 606 So. 2d 1341, 1346-50 (La. Ct.
App.) (court upholds injunction against disposal of waste from Superfund site; disposal
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III. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER GOVERNMENT ACTION
Citizens should not have to force their government either to en-
force the law or to enforce the laws more equitably. In the first
instance, it is the government agencies, therefore, that need to di-
rect their attention and resources towards ensuring nondiscrimi-
natory enforcement. Federal and state environmental agencies
can do much to address any unfair disparate impacts from their
enforcement activities without having to amend existing statutes
or regulations.
EPA and state environmental agencies could take a first step
towards ensuring that their laws and regulations are enforced
equally in minority and low income communities by increasing the
agency's awareness both of the possible problem of unequal en-
forcement and of the demographics and socioeconomic status of
the communities around regulated facilities. 192 Because enforce-
ment activities may be influenced by the demographics of the com-
munity and the ability of the community to participate in the
agency's decisionmaking processes, knowledge of the community's
characteristics can help the agency better recognize any uninten-
tional bias that might affect the agency's enforcement-related
decisions.
Outreach and education are other important ways to remedy
unequal access. EPA is aware that low income and minority com-
munities are less likely to be aware of the agency's activities and
responsibilities and are, therefore, less likely to participate in the
agency's decisionmaking process. 9 ' The degree of attention paid
by an agency to a violating facility or waste site can be strongly
would violate section 121(d)(3) of CERCLA and landfill's agreement with local govern-
ment), writ denied, 609 So. 2d 234 (La. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2339 (1993). But see
Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212,
1217-18 (8th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing United States v. Colorado because case was action
brought by state, not by citizen), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1994).
192 See U.S. E.P.A., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY (DRAFT 4) 5 (1994). "Each region
should identify affected communities or populations using EPA-developed general national
guidance. Criteria in that guidance may include: demographic racial and ethnic makeup of
a community, income levels, population sensitivity, environmental exposures, past regula-
tory practices, and previous and ongoing interactions with the community." Id.; TEXAS
ENVTL. EQUITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, A REPORT TO THE TEXAS WATER COMMISSION &
THE TEXAS AIR CONTROL BOARD 19 (1993) [hereinafter TExAS ENVTL. EQUITY AND JUSTICE
TASK FORCE] (recommending development of database of information on enforcement ac-
tions, demographic and socioeconomic information, health data, complaints, etc., to help
agency be proactive with respect to equitable treatment of all communities).
193 See SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 27, at 19 (agency employees noted that poor
and racial minority communities are rarely involved in agency rulemakings and seem una-
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influenced by the amount of attention drawn to the site by the
local community. 19 4
The ability of an affected community to influence enforcement
decisions takes both knowledge of the enforcement process and re-
sources. Little information is provided by EPA, and probably less
by states, identifying particular violations that have been detected
and what enforcement responses the agency intends to pursue.
Although EPA publishes its administrative penalties and pro-
posed settlements in the Federal Register,195 this notice would not
likely reach affected communities, particularly communities
whose members lack knowledge of and access to the Federal Reg-
ister. In fact, EPA has no policy or procedure for notifying a com-
munity when a violation is detected at a facility in their
neighborhood.
Educating the community about the enforcement process and
providing more accessible notice concerning both violations and
proposed enforcement actions will enable communities to express
their views and will encourage agencies to take greater account of
community concerns when exercising enforcement judgment. 196 A
ware of their ability to use agency resources and to petition ATSDR to perform health
assessments).
194 See Zimmerman, supra note 60, at 661-62; Hazardous Waste Company Shuts Down
Operations Under State Court Settlement, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1275 (1991) (attorney gen-
eral credits citizen activists for alerting state officials to continuing problems at facility);
see also Community Activists Can Push Company to Take Extra Steps, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30
1993, at S5 (more than 50% of corporate general counsel said community activists had
forced company to focus additional attention on environmental concerns at their facilities).
195 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1992) (Department of Justice shall lodge consent decrees and
provide opportunity for public comment and consideration of comments); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(4) (1988) (before assessing administrative penalty under Clean Water Act, EPA
shall provide public notice and opportunity to comment); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (Supp. IV
1992) (before EPA consent decree or settlement agreement of any kind is final under Clean
Air Act, EPA shall provide opportunity by notice in Federal Register for persons to com-
ment); 42 U.S.C. § 7003 (1988) (prior to final entry of EPA settlement of RCRA imminent
hazard claim, agency must provide notice and opportunity for public to comment).
196 See Samara F. Swanston, Legal Strategies for Achieving Environmental Equity, 18
YALE J. INT'L L. 337, 342 (1993) (if trained to monitor environmental notices, citizens can
have greater say in environmental decisions). EPA's Enforcement Management Council
Workgroup identified improved access to information on enforcement and increased aware-
ness of ways to participate in the enforcement process as two ways to empower the public
and address unequal enforcement. See EMC Enforcement Workgroup Report, supra note
28, at 11, 17-19. "A powerful opportunity for insuring equity may be the education of the
public, particularly disadvantaged communities, about how the environmental enforce-
ment process and their citizen enforcement authorities operate under environmental law.
This would be a significant step in empowering the public." Id.
In apparent recognition that the "public participation" provisions in CERCLA have be-
come more like public relations efforts and not the meaningful involvement that communi-
ties expect, the Clinton Administration's Superfund reauthorization bill would require EPA
to provide for "early, direct and meaningful community involvement in each significant
ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
requirement that agencies publish notice, in a timely and accessi-
ble manner, of all violations detected by inspectors and of the en-
forcement actions pending and concluded would foster greater
community involvement. 197 Such notice would not only make it
easier for communities to influence the enforcement process, it
could have a deterrent effect by embarrassing the offending par-
ties into future compliance. 198
Because most environmental enforcement actions are taken by
state agencies and because those agencies are even less likely
than EPA to have guidance documents to help ensure that en-
forcement decisions are made in an unbiased, systematic way, 199 a
greater effort must be made to force states to take steps to ensure
that their enforcement decisions do not discriminate. EPA ac-
knowledges the applicability of Title VI to its financial assistance
programs, 20 0 but has not, to date, investigated possible discrimi-
natory enforcement activities by state and local agencies receiving
federal financial assistance.20 '
Although much of the enforcement of federal environmental
laws has been delegated to the states,20 2 EPA has the ability
through its pre-award review and enforcement monitoring activi-
ties under Title VI to ensure that state enforcement actions do not
discriminate.0 3 EPA also retains the authority, through its dele-
gation regulations and agreements, to oversee state implementa-
tion and enforcement of federal environmental laws.20 4 Therefore,
phase of response activities." S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 102-105 (1994); H.R. 3800,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 102-105 (1994).
197 See, e.g., Atiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-105(3) & (4) (1988) (list of violations found by
inspectors and enforcement actions taken by agency is compiled annually and is required to
be submitted solely to governor and legislators); LA. ADmiN. CODE tit. 33, §§ VII.113(A)
(1993), V.717(A)(5)(d) (1992) (notice of enforcement actions shall be issued "periodically"
through department bulletin).
198 See generally Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by
Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. Ray. 2387 (1992).
199 See supra notes 6-7, 92, 110 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 106.
201 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
202 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
203 See LouisLANA ADviSORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 27, at 93. EPA's Title VI compli-
ance program includes: complaint processing;, pre-award reviews; postaward reviews; tech-
nical assistance; and enforcement monitoring. Id. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.105 to .135
(1993).
204 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 123.24 (1993) (broad authority for EPA to include terms and
conditions in memorandum of agreement authorizing state Clean Water Act program); 40
C.F.R. § 271.8 (1992) (RCRA state authorization agreements); see also EMC Enforcement
Workgroup Report, supra note 28, at 6 ("EPA retains authority to oversee state implemen-
tation of the statutes and may audit certain programs.").
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EPA can encourage, and indeed even force, state agencies to ad-
dress the issue of discriminatory enforcement.
EPA has often proposed to target enforcement against indus-
tries located near poor or minority areas.205 In light of the strong
evidence that minority and low income communities are being ex-
posed to a disproportionate amount of pollution and risk to their
health,20 6 targeted enforcement seeks to focus the agency's re-
sources (for example, inspections or administrative or judicial ac-
tions) on the areas and persons who are suffering the greatest
risks.20 7 A similar strategy is to develop enforcement initiatives
that focus on types of pollution problems that are more prevalent
in minority or low income communities. An example is to target
enforcement of pesticide regulations or rules on lead, two hazards
for which minorities are at greater risk.20 8
As an example of targeted enforcement, EPA cites to a 1990
lawsuit filed in East Chicago against a steel plant that resulted in
a $3.5 million penalty and commitment by the company to spend
$26 million to reduce pollution.20 9 Yet even with all of the discus-
sion about targeted enforcement, few cases have been filed that
direct enforcement resources towards disadvantaged
communities.210
205 See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Unequal Enforcement to be Probed, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5,
1993, at 3; Environmental Equity Warrants Consideration This Session of Congress, Law-
yers, Activists Say, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 3089 (1993); Memorandum
from EMC workgroup on Equity in Enforcement to Enforcement Management Council 13
(Apr. 14, 1993) (draft on file with author); see also Memorandum from Myles E. Flint, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General et al., Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, to All Section Chiefs 4 (Sept. 3, 1993) (on file with author) (alterna-
tive strategies for bringing environmental justice cases may include initiatives targeting
violators of environmental laws in identified burdened communities).
See TExAS EN rL. EQUITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, supra note 192, at 19. Targeted en-
forcement in high risk areas has also been recommended for state agencies as a way of
balancing enforcement resources between high-income areas that may file a large number
of complaints and low-income areas that are more affected but may not complain or may
find their complaints disregarded. Id.
206 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
207 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at 3; supra note 188 and accompanying text. In
order to identify and target enforcement resources, the agency will need better information
on the demographics and socioeconomic status, as well as the risks, in communities. Id.
208 See LAwYERs' CoMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESI-
DENTIAL TRANSITION TEAM FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES SUBMITrED By THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE TRANSITION GROUP 11
(1992).
209 See Marianne Lavelle, EPA Enforcement to Be Probed By Rights Commission, NATL
L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 3.
210 EPA has also identified the June 1993 filing of an enforcement action against Sher-
win Williams in a heavily industrialized, low-income minority community in southeast Chi-
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Environmental agencies could also improve enforcement in com-
munities that are disproportionately affected by pollution and
waste by making greater use of nonmonetary sanctions against
violators. When the penalty is paid by a violator, it will often go
into the U.S. Treasury or the general fund for the state and not
directly to the agency for use in environmental programs.21 ' In
those communities subjected to greater pollution, with the accord-
ingly greater risks to health and welfare, paying money to the gov-
ernment may do little to reduce the risks, except for the deter-
rence value of the penalty.
In a Supplemental Environmental Project ("SEP"), the violator
agrees, as part of a settlement, to expend money remediating the
adverse consequences of the violations or undertaking steps be-
yond those required by law to reduce pollution from the facility.212
A SEP might include a pollution prevention or reduction project, a
project to restore or repair damage done to the environment, an
audit to identify deficiencies that may be contributing to the viola-
tions, or an enforcement-related public awareness project.21
EPA has identified SEPs as a means of addressing the issue of
the disproportionate impact of pollution and waste on certain com-
munities, and there is no reason why. SEPs could not also be used
cago as an example of targeted enforcement. See Steven A. Herman, EPA's Enforcement
Priorities for Fiscal Year 1994, NAT'L ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Feb. 1994, at 3, 11. Region X
is using environmental justice factors to determine which facilities will be scheduled for
multimedia inspections. Id. Proposed legislation would force EPA to conduct compliance
inspections every two years at all toxic chemical facilities in the 100 counties with the
highest toxic chemical releases. See S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(d) (1993); H.R. 2105,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1993).
211 Under the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(a), (b) (1994), unless Con-
gress directs otherwise, public funds shall be deposited in the Treasury. States, however,
often use penalties to run environmental programs and, therefore, may have less incentive
to reduce fines and redirect the money to community projects. See Growth Expected in Pro-
gram to Cut Fines in Exchange for Pollution Prevention, [Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) 2692, 2694 (1993) [hereinafter Growth Expected in Program]; see also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:2015(C) (West Supp. 1994) (all sums recovered through penalties shall be
paid into Environmental Trust Fund).
212 See U.S. E.PYA., EPA POLICY ON THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PRoJEcTS IN ENFORCEMENT SETTLEMENTS (1991).
213 Id. at 2-4. Under EPA's policy, general education or environmental awareness
projects, contributions to research, and projects unrelated to enforcement but otherwise
beneficial to the community are not allowed. Id. at 5; Growth Expected in Program, supra
note 211, at 2692. SEPs are now included in 5 to 10 percent of settlements of EPA enforce-
ment cases. As an example, EPA reduced a proposed administrative penalty from $34,000
to $1,000 in exchange for the company's agreement to make improvements to the plant that
would substantially reduce emissions of chemicals. See Facility Improvements Allowed in
Lieu of Penalties, [Current Development] Env't Rep. (BNA) 164 (1990).
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in a like manner by state agencies.214 SEPs should be encouraged
where they will directly benefit the community, not just the viola-
tor.215 Where an agency does not require the implementation of a
SEP as part of a settlement, citizens could object to the settlement
on the grounds that it does not adequately protect the public inter-
est and is not fair to the community surrounding the noncomply-
ing facility.216
Finally, additional legal and technical resources for minority
and low income communities would help alleviate unequal en-
forcement. It is perhaps not a coincidence that some of largest
penalties imposed by EPA have been against facilities that have
214 See U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY (DRAFT 4) 6 (1994); EMC Enforce-
ment Workgroup Report, supra note 28, at 14.
215 See LAwYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAw, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION TEAM FOR THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE I(1)
(1992) (requesting that for areas experiencing disproportional impact, Department should
focus on settlements and confer benefits of environmental protection through creative
means). To retain the deterrent effect of a SEP, companies should not be able to deduct the
SEP expenses as a cost of doing business, particularly since EPA does not allow companies
to deduct the cost of penalties. See Growth Expected in Program, supra note 211, at 2693
(corporate environmental attorney states companies love SEPs because "they can deduct
the expense as a cost of doing business."); U.S. E.P.A., MODEL CERCLA RD/RA CONSENT
DECREE, reprinted in 22 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 1010, 1040 (1991) (example of EPA lan-
guage on prohibiting deductibility of penalties for tax purposes).
216 See generally United States v. Akzo Coatings, 949 F.2d 1409, 1435 (6th Cir. 1991)
(standard for court approving settlement is whether proposed decree's terms are fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate; protection of public interest is key consideration); United States v.
Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Alaska 1977) (appropriate standard is whether
decree adequately protects public interest).
The United States has taken the position that a court may not order an environmental
project by the defendant in lieu of paying penalties, although the parties to a consent de-
cree may themselves agree to such an arrangement. See Public Interest Research Group v.
Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1990) (all penalties assessed by
court, rather than through agreement of parties in decree, shall be paid to Treasury; dis-
trict court is without authority to order penalties be paid into trust fund to be used for
improving New Jersey's environment), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Sierra Club, Inc.
v. Electronic Controls Design, 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (while court cannot order
defendant in citizens' suit to make payments to organization other than Treasury, prohibi-
tion does not extend to settlement agreement). But see United States v. City of San Diego,
21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,223, 21,226 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (court finds section 309(d)
of Clean Water Act permits court to consider permanent water conservation projects as
form of penalty and in lieu of $2.5 million penalty payable to U.S. Treasury). The 1990
amendments to Clean Air Act authorize district courts to apply up to $100,000 towards
beneficial mitigation projects in lieu of being deposited into the Treasury. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
Although a court may not be able to order that penalty funds be directed to an environ-
mentally beneficial project, a court could refuse to enter the decree by finding that the
failure to address the health and environmental problems of the community makes the
decree unfair. Even were the citizens not successful in blocking entry of the decree, their
opposition may influence the government to pay more attention to the needs of the commu-
nity in future settlement agreements.
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also been the subject of legal enforcement action by citizens.217
Current Justice Department officials have expressed their desire
to assist citizen suit plaintiffs, representing a change from past
government hostility towards such suits.2 18 The government could
also assist citizens in the legal arena by eliminating the practice of
opposing citizen intervention into government enforcement ac-
tions, thereby making it easier for citizens to intervene.219
The Technical Assistance Grants ("TAG") program under CER-
CIA provides government grants of up to $50,000 for community
organizations to obtain technical assistance in interpreting infor-
mation at Superfund NPL sites.220 EPA has recognized the poten-
tial of TAGs to help increase the involvement and effectiveness of
minority and low income communities. 221 However, the TAG pro-
gram has been underutilized by the public, in part because of the
217 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 12, at S6. "One factor that seems clear from the cases
N.J analyzed is that citizen involvement raises penalties. Top penalties among the RCRA
and multilaw cases were levied where citizens took the dramatic step of joining the litiga-
tion." Id. The authors cite as examples $1.2 million fine against Penntech Papers, Inc.,
where EPA brought its action after a citizen suit, and $2.8 million fine against Environ-
mental Waste Control, Inc., where citizens intervened in federal enforcement action. Id.
218 Compare Environmental Laws to be Top Priority with New Administration, DOJ's
Hubbell Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-194 (1993) (Department of Justice official
says department intends to begin program to help community groups that wish to file citi-
zens suits; will work to strengthen citizen suit sections within Clean Water Act when it
comes before Congress for authorization; and would seek to broaden use of citizen suits)
with Thomas E. Hookano, The Government Perspective, 17 Envtl. Lit. Rep. 10,260, 10,261
(1987) (Department of Justice official expresses concern that citizen suits could have detri-
mental effect on government enforcement efforts by leading to inappropriate remedies, di-
verting government resources away from government priorities, and shifting government
resources away from enforcement and toward regulatory and administrative process by
encouraging more challenges by industry to permit conditions).
Citizen suits have been very effective in spurring reluctant agencies to enforce the law.
"Citizen suits are a proven enforcement tool. They operate as Congress intended-to both
spur and supplement government enforcement actions." See S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 28 (1985); see also Daniel Riesel, Citizen Suits and the Award of Attorneys' Fees in
Environmental Litigation, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY-ENvIRONMETAL LITIGATION
919 (1993) (citizen suits have caused increased sensitivity to enforcement by environmen-
tal agencies). Increased use of citizen suits has been identified as a strategy for achieving
environmental equity. See Swanstn, supra note 196, at 342-43.
219 See United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984)
(government objected to citizen intervention in litigation over cleanup of Love Canal).
Even where a citizens group is allowed to intervene, the group's refusal to agree to a con-
sent decree between the government and defendant will not preclude entry of the decree by
the court. See United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 85 (D. Alaska 1977);
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1080 (W.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984).
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e) (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.4000-4130 (1992).
221 See, e.g., Administration Dedicated to Reform of Law, EPA Deputy Administrator
Tells NACEPT Panel, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1315 (1993); EPA EQUITY
WORKGROUP REPORT, supra note 27, at 30; EMC Enforcement Workgroup Report, supra
note 28, at 19.
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administrative burdens associated with applying for, obtaining
and using the grants.222 TAGs are an example of government
assistance to community organizations seeking to address pollu-
tion in their communities that could, and should, be expanded
under CERCLA and replicated in other statutes.223
CONCLUSION
It is time to bring the government's enforcement of environmen-
tal laws out from behind closed doors and inaccessible agency pro-
ceedings and into the communities that are directly affected by
the pollution. The empirical evidence of unequal enforcement is
conflicting, and there is clearly a need for more data to determine
the extent of discrimination as well as to focus better on the
causes and cures. The often unbridled prosecutorial discretion en-
joyed by the government, coupled with enforcement decisions that
are either unsupported in the record or not made with the partici-
pation or consultation of the community, surely create conditions
that make unequal enforcement not just possible, but expected.
Moreover, when repeated observations confirm that the enforce-
ment decisions of environmental agencies are influenced by the
degree of pressure and attention placed on a particular problem,
there is a demonstrated need to ensure that enforcement decisions
do not overlook those communities that may well be suffering both
from a disproportionate amount of pollution and an inability to
participate effectively in the enforcement process.
The enforcement of environmental laws is a very formalized
legal undertaking. Inspections are made according to prescribed
procedures, violations are determined by comparing the behavior
to standardized legal norms, the accused are provided with legal
proceedings to challenge the charges, and the case is resolved
222 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA's SUPERFUND TAG PROGRAM-GRMTS BENE-
FIT CITIZENS BuT ADMINISTRATm BARRIERS REMAIN 1-2 (1992); see also S. 1834, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(a), (b) (1994); H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(a), (b) (1994) (the
Clinton Administration's Superfund reauthorization bills propose amendments to EPA's
TAG authority that will address some concerns).
223 See S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1993); H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301
(1993). The proposed Environmental Justice Act would establish TAGS awarded by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to any individual or group in an environmental
high impact area for use in obtaining technical assistance relating to environmental com-
pliance inspections and health studies. Id.
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through a negotiated legal document or by a judicial officer.2 24
These laws and procedures are difficult to navigate for even the
experienced environmental lawyer, and almost impossible for
many communities.225 Making enforcement proceedings more ac-
cessible to communities and increasing the availability of legal
assistance for low income and minority communities must be part
of any solution to unequal enforcement of environmental laws. If
the accused will surely have its legal representative challenging
any proposed enforcement action, and if the agency seems primar-
ily concerned about ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the
regulated community, then the persons most affected by the non-
compliance must be assured of having an equal opportunity to
have their interests directly and adequately represented in the
proceedings.226
The participation need not, and indeed should not, be by law-
yers alone. The observation that most community environmental
struggles are not won solely through the hands of lawyers is pro-
foundly accurate.227 If equal enforcement of environmental laws is
to be achieved, then all aspects of the enforcement process need to
be opened up to the residents of the affected communities-their
participation in making enforcement policies and decisions must
be sought out, their opinions and desires respected and addressed,
and their ability to protect their own communities and police the
facilities in those communities enhanced. Without such effective
224 See ABA COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, REPORT TO THE HousE OF DELEGATES 14
(1993) (report to ABA on environmental justice identifies impediments that prevent full
participation by minority and low-income communities in environmental decisionmaking).
225 Id.
226 The American Bar Association's House of Delegates adopted a resolution urging
agencies to give priority attention to the problem of environmental discrimination by,
among other things, improving agency procedures governing access to information and de-
cision making process; distributing information about environmental impacts and applica-
ble laws; and urging increased delivery of legal services in the area of environmental law to
minority and low income communities. ABA, RESOLUTION (Aug. 11, 1993); see also Steven
Keeva, A Breath of Justice, ABA J., Feb. 1994, at 88, 90; ABA Sec. on Individual Rights &
Responsibilities, Not in My Backyard, HUMAN RIGHTS, Fall 1993, at 26, 29. See generally
Richard J. Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environmental Justice' 5 MD. J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 1, 11 (1994).
227 See Cole, supra note 11, at 648. "Poor people understand that environmental hazards
are not legal problems, but political problems." Id. Cole has advocated that "lawyers play
second fiddle to community organizations." Keeva, supra note 226, at 92. Others have ar-
gued that achieving environmental justice for poor and minority communities will require
that lawyers be prepared to use not just litigation, but also public education, community
organizing, legislative activities, and civil disobedience. Id. at 91 (quoting Alice Brown,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund); see also Godsil, supra note 95, at 426-27 (advocating use of
civil rights era techniques to ensure government accountability).
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citizen participation and government accountability, one should
not be surprised to find environmental laws unequally enforced.
